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UNION,

NECESSARY TO

SECURITY.

ADDRESSED TO THE

LOYAL INHABITANTS OF IRELAND.

BY

ARCHIBALD REDFOORD, ESQ.

——BONAQUE AC MALA NON SUA NATURA, SED VOCIBUS SEDITIOSORUM ÆSTIMANTUR.

TACITUS.

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UNION

NECESSARY

TO SECURITY.

THE moſt of the following pages were written many months ago: but as the agitation of the queſtion which produced them had begun to ſubſide, and had occaſioned a degree of offence which required time to remove or qualify, it was judged not proper then to obtrude them upon the public. However, the Author has for a conſiderable time obſerved with ſome ſatisfaction, that the proſecution of the meaſure of Union between theſe kingdoms has been on every proper occaſion announced by the Executive in both Countries, and that the Britiſh legiſlature has ſo far ſeriouſly diſcuſſed the ſubject as to lay a uſeful ground for future conſideration; and he has alſo obſerved with ſtill greater ſatisfaction, that there has been a gradual acceſſion to the number of diſintereſted and ſenſible perſons in

 private

private life, who diſcover a diſpoſition to conſider the queſtion with candour, upon the principles of genuine publick good, free from that indiſcriminating indignation againſt government which upon every occaſion ſeems to be fooliſhly confounded with the virtue of patriotiſm, and from that prejudice againſt England, which marks the dangerous ſeparatiſt, rather than the true friend to his country. Notwithſtanding therefore the multiplicity of productions on the ſubject, and the neceſſary ſimilarity of ideas in thoſe who maintain the ſame opinion, yet, as the matter is of no common concern, and as almoſt every man has ſomething peculiar in his views or his manner of communicating them, calculated to impreſs particular readers, it may be uſeful, perhaps a duty, to publiſh the ſimple and unbiaſſed reſult of honeſt inquiry.

In the conſideration of the queſtion of Union, as well as of every other important moral or political queſtion, every man no doubt will be more or leſs influenced by the opinions or principles he has happened previouſly to receive. There are many who have viewed the late ſeries of revolutions, or rather convulſions, and the concomitant wildneſſes, in France, with ſatisfaction, and have followed the progreſs of French arms and French principles with delight. They think indeed that ſome new meaſures ought to take place; yet not ſuch as ſhall bind together all the parts of the Britiſh Empire more cloſely, and thereby enable them more firmly to reſiſt all aſſaults from without or from within, upon our common and well tried conſtitution; but ſuch as ſhall ſubvert all that has been happily eſtabliſhed, and, by forming us upon the new plans of France,

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France, ſhall render us ſubſervient to the views of that deſtroying nation, which they wiſh to ſee univerſally triumphant as the grand renovator of mankind. There are others who, though differing from the former in their opinion of the nature and conſequences of French principles, yet foſter very invidious ſentiments againſt Great Britain, conſider a compleat Union with that Country as, what they call, the *extinction of Ireland*, and, acknowledging the full conſequence of their opinion, would rather compleatly ſeparate than compleatly unite. With either of theſe deſcriptions of perſons it is plain that any diſcuſſion of any Union, under any circumſtances, or in any juncture, muſt meet with inſtant and prejudging reprobation. But, to *the loyal* inhabitants of Ireland, who ſeek the permanency of the Britiſh Conſtitution, the ſecurity of our religion, and the ſtability of the common empire, it may be uſefully propoſed to conſider, whether, contemplating the formidable change which has taken place in the ſtate of ſurrounding nations, and the deſperate machinations, as new in their ſyſtem as wicked in their nature, which for years have been pointed at our exiſtence, it may not be wiſe to adopt ſome fair, liberal and juſt, plan of compleat conſolation, which, more effectually than hitherto, ſhall, conſiſtently with national proſperity, ſecure theſe kingdoms againſt the foreign foe and the domeſtic traitor.

Whatever difference of opinion may ſubſiſt among the loyal inhabitants of this country, we are all decidedly agreed, that a ſeparation between theſe kingdoms would prove the certain deſtruction of both. Britain is powerful; and, for the ſake of her own ſafety,

ſafety, as well as of preſerving that integrity of power which has given dignity, proſperity and ſecurity to the empire, ſhe would neceſſarily make every poſſible effort to recover Ireland. What muſt be the conſequence? Either Ireland is reduced, and as a conquered country is ſubjected to ſuch ſyſtem of depreſſing dependence as to the more powerful country appears neceſſary; or ſhe is aided by the formidable and ambitious nation which for centuries has been engaged in hoſtilities with England, and after a ſtruggle in which Britain and Ireland become exhauſted, France ever watchful for her prey ſeizes the fatal occaſion, and ſubjugates to her humiliating and devouring policy theſe noble iſlands, which, cloſely united, are formed to riſe ſuperiour among the nations and to arbitrate for Europe. But it is obvious that if ſeparation be effected, it muſt be by the aſſiſtance of France in the firſt inſtance. Rebellion, howſoever ſecretly and artfully prepared, and howſoever daringly and ferociouſly attempted, could not long ſucceed, unaided by a foreign foe, againſt the fleets and armies of Britain. The uniform hiſtory of mankind, and our own recent experience, inform us of the means that would be employed. We have already ſeen what can be effected by ſecret machinations. What more would be accompliſhed when the wealth, and power, and rank, and numbers ſhould be increaſed of thoſe, who under the exciting pretext of conſulting the dignity of independent Ireland, ſhould ſeek the rueful phantom *ſeparation*, the mind ſhudders to contemplate:—correſpondence—emiſſaries—concerted plans—powerful invaſions—internal and wide-ſpread maſſacre—final ſucceſs—and a republick upon a French model, under French protection,

protection, and ſubject to French dominion. Then follow in due courſe, the reign of the moſt vicious profligates, the murder or baniſhment of all the families of property, the degradation and deſtruction of all religion, and a legalized ſyſtem of atheiſm and vice. *Pollutæ cærimoniæ; magna adulteria; plenum exiliis mare; infecti cædibus ſcopuli; atrocius in urbe ſævitum. Nobilitas, opes, omiſſi geſtique honores, pro crimine; et ob virtutes certiſſimum exitium.*

It is ſaid, that if the intereſt of Great Britain were not materially concerned in a Union, the government of that country would not propoſe the meaſure: and truly it muſt be owned, that Great Britain is deeply intereſted indeed, to promote any meaſure that can tend to prevent the ſeparation of Ireland. By ſuch a ſeparation, ſhe not only loſes an arm of ſtrength which powerfully aids her in common defence, but a material part of her own power is converted againſt herſelf. France, a mighty, an ambitious, and a malignant ſtate, with ſuch additional power in her hands as Ireland—an iſland with great natural wealth, not without conſiderable acquired wealth, populous, of uncommon maritime capacity, and lying under the boſom and heart of England—France, with ſuch aid, and with ſuch a fulcrum on which to work engines of deſtruction, muſt ſoon conſummate her abhorred purpoſe;—and then, overpowered, deſpoiled, and ſubjugated, the naval bulwark of the world reſiſts and protects no more.

Suis et ipſa Roma viribus ruit.

Without urging this obvious and alarming truth farther,

ther, therefore, it may be taken as fully admitted, that the ſeparation of Britain and Ireland muſt be conſidered by every loyal inhabitant of this country, as an event moſt afflictive and ruinous to us and to our poſterity, and againſt which it would be mad and wicked not to ſeek for every poſſible ſecurity.

But the peculiar circumſtances of this country have unfortunately foſtered in the minds of the great body of the people an hoſtility to the Engliſh name, and a diſpoſition to ſeparate, of which the foreign foe on every occaſion has been ready to take advantage. In order to illuſtrate this poſition, it may be ſatisfactory to take a ſhort review of former events.

Above ſix centuries ago, this country, then in a ſtate of barbariſm, was reduced to a connexion with England. A ferocious hatred to the Engliſh ſettlers, as well as to their laws and cuſtoms, for ages actuated the natives; and it was not until after a long period of animoſity and conteſt, that at length Engliſh laws were adopted, and Engliſh language and manners gained any place. Ireland, it is well known, whatever might have been its civilization in a very remote antiquity, was, at the time of its reduction by Henry the ſecond, and for centuries after, in ſo uncivilized a ſtate compared with the reſt of Europe, that it was little if at all prepared, to take part in thoſe ardent ſcenes, in which the revival of letters firſt, and then the reformation, engaged moſt of the other nations, and England among the chief. There, intellectual light, which had before occaſionally darted gleams of ſplendour through the prevailing gloom, began to ſpread a general influence; the zeal

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of the reformers met with a rapidity of ſucceſs; and the *eccentricity* of Henry the eighth, the cheriſhing care of Edward the ſixth, even the perſecution by Mary, and the wiſdom, firmneſs, and perhaps good fortune, of Elizabeth, all contributed to ſuperſede a reign of darkneſs and ſuperſtition, and to eſtabliſh in that kingdom, almoſt univerſally, a religion, mild, pure, and of happy influence. It is not meant, however, to paſs any decided opinion on the peculiar nature of the reformation, or the means by which it was accompliſhed. Violent enmities, deſtructive wars, and laſting diviſions, were among its attendants and conſequences: and perhaps, had the milder opinions of the amiable and learned Eraſmus prevailed, moderate and gradual corrections would have been adopted, more conducive to the general improvement of men both in knowledge and virtue. But the retroſpect tends to ſhew, that a material and operative change had univerſally taken place in the minds of the people of England, and had been formed into a national eſtabliſhment, at a time when Ireland, though then connected, was excluded from the operation of cauſes which would have aſſimilated her to England; and, by uniformity of opinion in the moſt intereſting concern to man, with the natural concomitant uniformity of manners and obſervances, would, inſtead of inflaming animoſity and preventing intercourſe, have promoted friendſhip and union between the original inhabitants and the Engliſh ſettlers, as well as among the Engliſh ſettlers themſelves. But the ancient feud now became embittered by religious antipathy; and by degrees, mutual offence carried enmity to the higheſt pitch, until at length, rebellion and

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maſſacre, on one ſide, called forth, on the other, ſignal ſeverities.

During the whole of this perturbed period, eſpecially from the time of the reformation, England and Ireland can be conſidered in no other light than as hoſtile nations. The proteſtants of Ireland, unhappily involved in almoſt conſtant contention with the reſt of the inhabitants, were often reduced to miſery and extremity. The Engliſh nation not only conſidered them as their brethren, a portion of themſelves, to be protected againſt thoſe among whom they were ſettled, but looked upon their ſafety as involving the ſecurity of the independence of Ireland. Laws therefore were enacted in England, and through the influence of that country, laws were adopted here, which no doubt retarded the national improvement, and increaſed the prejudice againſt England, but which, apprehenſions for the ſafety of the proteſtant ſettlers and the ſecurity of the connexion of the two kingdoms, ſeemed to make neceſſary. Theſe apprehenſions were and have been ſo frequently and alarmingly juſtified, that, though it is impoſſible to approve of oppreſſive policy, yet it was neither unnatural nor quite inexcuſable in England, then frequently diſtracted within herſelf, anxious for her own ſafety, and earneſt in the preſervation of the eſtabliſhment civil and religious in Ireland, to adopt the only means which circumſtances ſeemed to permit, to prevent foreign and internal foes from accompliſhing their purpoſes.

In the time of Elizabeth, internal rebellion conſpired with the foreign enemy to deſtroy our religion and to ſubjugate

ſubjugate this country to Spain. In the time of Charles the firſt, advantage was taken of the diſtracted ſtate of England, and every deſtructive engine was employed, to exterminate among us the proteſtant religion and name, and to cut off for ever our connexion with our beſt protector. And in the time of James the ſecond a ſimilar attempt was made, and by means which impreſſed deep and laſting effects on the minds of our anceſtors. France, the friend that now holds forth her bleſſings to us and to the reſt of Europe, then lent her aid; and James himſelf was forced to concur in the act, which, making Ireland independent of the crown of England, formed a grand ſtep towards the accompliſhment of the deep rooted ſcheme of ſeparation. The ſufferings, the efforts and the event of that day are univerſally known; and the conſequences were, that the Engliſh nation and government, and the proteſtant ſettlers in Ireland, were corroborated and decided in the impoſing neceſſity, which long and recent experience had in their apprehenſion taught them, of reſtraining the Roman catholicks, who compoſed the great body of the inhabitants, and of ſecuring the independence of Ireland upon that country to which the proteſtants owed their origin, and to which they cheriſhed their attatchment.

Now, with ſuch a diſpoſition, of ancient origin, repeatedly revived, and peculiarly aggravated, let us ſuppoſe theſe kingdoms to be equal in wealth and power, and, excepting the circumſtance of the king of England being ipſo facto king of Ireland, formally and virtually independent of each other. What muſt be

the conſequence? So far back as we have any records of the nature and conduct of man, we learn with certainty that individuals or nations, whenever upon an equality of power, or approaching to that equality, have uniformly exhibited the jealouſy of rivalſhip, and by ſure conſequence a contention for dominion, deſtructive always of mutual happineſs, and fatal often to exiſtence. In nations, theſe motives of action, which among individuals in civilized ſociety are reſtrained by fear of the laws or of publick opinion, are not only unreſtrained by any principle, but acquire accumulated force from all the paſſions both good and bad to be found in the community. Ardent attachment to our own nation, ariſing from habitual aſſociations; the pride of national dignity and power; party ſpirit; hatred of a rival; reſentment of wrongs; heated ſympathy in a common cauſe, inflamed by multiplied communication into undiſtinguiſhing paſſion; the love of violence, always operative in the unthinking but active and turbulent majority; all theſe conſtituent energies in our nature, as they may be called, and more that might be enumerated, concur, in the ſituation ſuppoſed, with the precious long foſtered deſire of ſeparation, to produce neceſſarily, either that event, or a conqueſt by one or the other ſtate, equally deſtructive and equally to be deprecated. Let it be added, that theſe nations are eminently wealthy and powerful: conſequently their intereſts muſt be important, numerous, and complicated; and the actual colliſion of their reſpective intereſts, therefore, will frequently occur. When the colliſion happens, what muſt follow? From equal power and perfect independence, no yielding on either part can take place; the inveterate diſpoſition to ſeparate acts in the contrary direction; deſtructive con-

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teſt therefore becomes inevitable, followed by conqueſt or ſeparation, with all the reſpective fatal conſequences.

But to enſure the effect, a powerful ſtate, of determined hoſtility to one of theſe nations, is conſtantly vigilant to diſcover, and alert to ſeize, every occaſion for deſtroying the connexion. Surely no man of common ſenſe or common information can pretend, that ſuch a connexion in ſuch a ſtate of things could permanently ſubſiſt, or that it would be leſs than hopeleſs folly to labour for its preſervation.

Yet the connexion has ſubſiſted, has been preſerved for centuries; and from the time of James the ſecond to the late conſpiracy and and rebellion, this country has remained in tolerable ſecurity, notwithſtanding the menaces of France, and her actual attempts, to invade and reduce Ireland in former wars with Great Britain, and notwithſtanding the factious ſpirit, whetted by religious acrimony, which, operating in various forms and under various names, has encouraged the foes of England.

But how has the connexion ſubſiſted, and how has it been preſerved? Not as a connexion of two independent kingdoms, in which the claims, and privileges, and free exertions of the one, were neither interfered with nor affected by the other;—not as a connexion of two diſtinct kingdoms, joined by the ſimple adoption of the ſame executive, yet of ſo extraordinary, or rather ſo miraculous a nature, that whatever common regulations, enterpriſes, or conflicts, in their various and multiplied relations and tranſactions, appear-

ed neceſſary to the one, were conſtantly and ſpontaneouſly entered into with kindred zeal by the other: No,—the connexion has been preſerved in a manner and by means which, howſoever neceſſary, and in whatever degree neceſſary, the friends of this country, and the true friends of both countries, have long deplored. The influence, or rather the commanding power of the ſuperior country was complete; this country exiſted as a dependent province; the legal code ſubſtantially originated with, or leaſt was modified by the government of Great Britain; reſtraining laws, framed to preſerve the civil and religious eſtabliſhment, againſt the great majority of the people, who were hoſtile to both, ſecured the country, but enchained the exertions of the inhabitants: and for a long period, the proteſtants of Ireland zealouſly concurred in this ſyſtem of policy; which they conſidered as neceſſary to their own ſafety, as well as to the national dependence upon England. The conſequences were, that the inhabitants in general were confined to poverty and dependence; the ariſtocracy, at an immenſe diſtance in rank, felt nothing in common with them, employed but rarely the means of conciliation, and enſured depreſſion rather than promoted proſperity; while the middle ranks of life, in which are found the qualities that reſiſt oppreſſion on the one ſide and promote induſtry on the other, were ſcarcely to be found in the community of Ireland.

This kind of connexion no doubt, and preſerved by theſe means, might ſubſiſt for ages without any ſerious apprehenſion of being endangered. But a ſtate of ſociety was induced, which militated againſt national happineſs

happineſs, and which hardly the cleareſt neceſſity could reconcile to a liberal mind.

The linen trade, however, which had been early encouraged, and had ſpread with animating ſucceſs over a large diſtrict of the North chiefly proteſtant; the proviſion trade of the fertile South; and ſome other ſcattered advantages, contributed, with the advancement of ſurrounding nations, to carry Ireland on in the general progreſs of the reſt of Europe. This gradual improvement; its natural conſequences,—diffuſed property and independent ſpirit; the habit of living together in the exerciſe of the arts of peace; the frequent interchange of good offices; and the exemplary conduct of many of the Roman Catholicks; all tended to create in every rank and ſect, the honeſt wiſh, that the natural advantages of the Country might be promoted; and that ſome liberality on the ſubject of religion might be extended, as the forerunner of cordiality and proſperity. The mutual communication of ſuch ſentiments begat and promoted liberality and publick ſpirit. A comprehenſive and enlightened policy in the cabinet and parliament of Great Britain concurred with that liberality and publick ſpirit. In conformity with theſe ſentiments, within the laſt twenty years, the reſtraints of which the Roman Catholicks complained have been removed; they have now enjoyed for a conſiderable time, and with very general concurrence, compleat toleration in religion, and every privilege in the acquiſition and employment of property that rational men could deſire; and at length has been added the elective franchiſe, by which not only an operative motive is given to the landholders to grant

grant uſeful leaſes to the Roman Catholicks of the poorer claſs, but conſiderable conſequence and influence follow to the general body. In the meantime the ſpirit of independence claimed, and the increaſing power of the Country demanded, other and important privileges and benefits. The precarious ſtate of publick affairs in the American conteſt, as well as the wiſdom of Britiſh councels, ſuggeſted the propriety of conceſſion. Accordingly, the parliament of Ireland was declared and confirmed compleatly independent; and this Country acquired, equally with Britain, not only unreſtrained commerce with the reſt of the world, but a participation in the colonial and plantation trade, which Great Britain had gained by great induſtry and enterpriſe and at enormous expence. The conſequences were important. Confidence and liberality gained upon the Proteſtant mind. We ſeemed to have forgotten all former animoſities and calamities, and to contend only for ſuperiority of zeal in atoning to each other and to our Country, for all the evils which the demon of diſcord had driven us to inflict. Induſtry, activity and ingenuity were called forth: the uſeful and productive arts of life were more earneſtly cultivated: we were enabled to reap larger benefit from the extenſion of Britiſh commerce: riches, power and independence increaſed: a ſcene of national proſperity opened to our view: and our hearts enjoyed the hope, that religious bigotry and hatred would never again diſturb our harmony, obſtruct our purſuits, or blaſt our proſpects.

We ſeemed to be liberalized; we became independent; we acquired great advantages. How have theſe circumſtances

circumſtances operated in combination with the extraordinary opinions and extraordinary events of the preſent day?

We are living in a period, in which every evil that could afflict ſociety, has been engendered, matured, and poured abroad, by a depraved nation, which, after deſtroying within its own territory, all law, religion, ſocial order, moral principle, and natural ſentiment, has ſought, by every mean, whether of vicious ingenuity or ferocious violence, to uproot the eſtabliſhed polity of every ſurrounding ſtate. Britain ſaw the danger advancing. She ſtood in the breach. She rallied the nations. They retired, diſunited, ſunk, and exhauſted. She alone maintained the conflict; arreſted the progreſs of organized barbariſm; and ſecured hope to the civilized world. On former occaſions ſhe had been commiſſioned to ſave the liberties of Europe; but now ſhe ſeemed deſtined to ſave, not merely eſtabliſhed laws and liberties, but every ſacred principle that makes human ſociety dear, and without which life would ceaſe to be a bleſſing. In this arduous conteſt, her deſperate enemy well knew the ſide on which only ſhe was weak, and where only he could hope to deſtroy her. Advantage was taken in Ireland of the great ſtruggle in which Great Britain was engaged. Myriads of demagogues, the moſt deſtructive and deteſtable things that can infeſt a nation, correſponded with the enemy, imported the principles of France in all their malignity, and rouſed the diſloyalty of the people by every art and pretext: and an organization, as it is called, was ſecretly carried on, by which the phyſical force of the Country was prepared, under

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fit leaders, to join the invading foe; in the wild hope that, loyalty and the eſtabliſhed religion being deſtroyed, Ireland would become ſeparated, and the religion of the multitude reign in more than fancied ſplendour. Now it is unfortunately to be remarked, that while Ireland was avowedly and compleatly dependent upon Great Britain, although national proſperity was retarded, yet this Country, notwithſtanding occaſional diſcontents and partial diſturbances, was preſerved in perfect ſecurity; and experience has ſhewn, that the removal of reſtraints, the enjoyment of privileges, even greater than had been expected, and an independent legiſlature, have not ſtrengthened either our internal ſecurity or our connexion with Great Britain.

Not long before the commencement of French revolutions, a demand for a change in the legiſlature of this country, which ſhould make it more dependent upon popular paſſions and popular arts, was ſo ſyſtematically and ſo boldly made, that parliament ſeemed to be overawed, and the friends of our eſtabliſhed laws and religion trembled for the conſequences. A convention, an armed convention, ſimilar to the late ruling clubs of France, in which members of the legiſlature aſſiſted, framed the plan which was to be dictated to parliament. Fortunately, the influence of the property poſſeſſed in this country by the Engliſh Ariſtocracy, and the diſcernment and firmneſs of many members of the legiſlature, fruſtrated the attempt: and indeed it muſt be owned that, many of the members of that convention, and of the then minority in parliament, have lived to witneſs ſuch proceedings and events, both abroad

abroad and at home, as have made them regret their opinions and conduct. Conventions, however, ſucceeded conventions; clubs multiplied upon clubs; popular influence increaſed and became commanding; and popular meaſures were repeatedly adopted by the legiſlature, ſome of which, upon the principle of Ireland being a diſtinct and independent ſtate, were to be approved of, but all of which tended to weaken the controul of Great Britain, neceſſary to the preſent ſtate of connexion. But all did not ſatisfy. The nation became agitated through its whole extent by ſeparatiſts and renovators. Strides were making towards ſeparation and republicaniſm. The legiſlature ſeemed to look on with amazement. At laſt, in December 1792, the national guards, as they were affectedly called, were actually preparing, and about to march in full diſplay, as the firſt act in the dreadful ſcene, which it was hoped, would, under the direction and aid of France, be ſoon completely exhibited. A conſiderable portion of the Roman Catholicks (many, very many of them, without wicked intention, but deceived by plotting conſpirators) moved in correſpondent ſyſtem. Roman Catholick parliaments met, diſcuſſed and diſſeminated the principles of inſubordination and reſiſtance, and promoted the *general plan of ſeparation*, which had been ſet on foot by a tribe of active leaders, many of them men of ſituation and abilities, and followed by no inconſiderable part of the wealth of the country. A party in the ſtate contending for power, and either not ſeeing or not regarding the conſequences, courted popularity, in a moment moſt eventful, as the inſtrument of aggrandizement; and then indeed, had not the ſupreme executive arreſted the danger, all things tended,

as at the commencement of the revolution in France, to produce the effects to be naturally expected, when rank and authority appear to ſanctify popular prejudice and enthuſiaſm. The evil ſwelled into enormous magnitude, grew bold and terrible by impunity and ſucceſs; and but for unprecedented exertions of power, would have perpetrated its deſigns.

This appears to plain ſenſe to be a train of conſequences, naturally flowing from that proud ſpirit of independence and diſtinct authority, which firſt grew with gradual proſperity, which ſtrengthened into overawing aſſertion of perfect equality, which, ſpreading through the community, generated jealouſy and rivalry, and, impregnating the prejudiced and violent multitude, prepared Ireland for the long-deſired and now deep-laid ſcheme of ſeparation.

The opportunities of acquiring property have been multiplied, and conſequently we have ſeen a great diffuſion of wealth among the lower orders of the community: but an attachment to the laws and conſtitution, under the protection and encouragement of which, property has been gained, has not been the conſequence of ſucceſs. On the contrary, a vulgar pride, an impatience of controul, a contempt of authority, have been added to the antient hoſtility; and accordingly, notwithſtanding that conceſſion has ſucceeded conceſſion, yet the chief effect on the minds of thoſe to whom they were granted, has been a loud and imperious demand of new and dangerous grants, which, now that the truth has broken forth, are confeſſed to have been

intended

intended as the means of effecting ſeparation and a modern republick.

Although thoſe demands, as we now clearly know, were ſo intended, yet the number of men of reſpect and influence, who, in a period of awful anxiety, joined in the call for emancipation and reform, was very conſiderable; and had not the deſtructive meaſures of the great conſpiracy been precipitated, it is not improbable that the dangerous opinions might ſo powerfully have prevailed, as ultimately to ſway the legiſlature. At all events we know, that in the very hour of dark conſpiracy, *reform* upon French models, calculated in form and ſpirit to give force and effect to democracy, with *emancipation*, which, under the pretext of religious liberality, was clearly intended to give the ſpirit of democracy extenſive prevalence, were ſplendidly propoſed under the ſanction of great names, and, as in France, ſeconded by the clubs. The executive power no doubt, and the moſt leading men of property deeply intereſted in the welfare of Ireland, deſcried the tendency of ſuch meaſures, and defeated them in that place, where indeed they would ſoon have proved fatal.

But the opinions which greatly prevail in any nation, gain by degrees upon men of condition and influence. Fear operates upon ſome; ambition upon others; the love of popularity upon many; and even the beſt characters often throw themſelves into a predominant party, in the vain hope of curing or preventing evils by accommodation. The hiſtory of mankind abounds with inſtances of this kind of progreſs: but modern

France furniſhes an impreſſive example, freſh in our obſervation, and pregnant with inſtruction.

Admit what we hope and expect, that Ireland continues, and, from the nature of proſperity, accelerates her progreſs in riches and power. It is by the people at large the acquiſition is made: great numbers therefore of the lower ranks are daily riſing into wealth and importance; conſequently the immenſe body, which has deeply imbibed principles inimical to our laws and religion, muſt rapidly gain extenſive influence; to be employed, as deſigning demagogues ſhall direct; who, flattering vulgar opulence, not confirmed in loyal principle by ages of uſeful habit, point the power of the country to deſtructive ends. The religious antipathy in the meantime operates; lends pretext to every ſcheme, and gives force to every effort; while the idle and the vicious, the vain, the enthuſiaſtick, and the theoretick, of every religion, or of no religion, ſwell the overpowering multitude of thoſe who demand renovation;—a renovation, purſued no doubt from various motives, and generally plauſible in the commencement, but approaching every hour, by haſtened ſtrides, to total overthrow.

Mobilitate viget, viresque acquirit eundo.
Parva metu primò; mox ſeſe attollit in auras.

In ſuch a ſtate of things, no man can be ſo unobſerving of human affairs as to ſuppoſe, that the legiſlature could remain ultimately uninfluenced. In the degree that general property and influence embrace particular opinions, men of the ſame opinions muſt find their way into the legiſlature. What muſt follow? Demands in favour

vour of democracy become formidable. Demands granted increaſe the power of democracy, and generate new demands. The power of the democracy becomes irreſiſtible: the antient antipathy to England gains ſtrength from that ſpirit of rivalry which grows with towering proſperity; and the deſtructive wiſh for ſeparation is prompted by pride as well as by prejudice.

Ireland then become immenſely powerful, and actuated by diſtinct intereſt and diſtinct patriotiſm, feels herſelf equal to a conteſt with Britain: or if prudence, ſuggeſting ſome diſparity, or apprehenſion of a party remaining favourable to Britain, ſhould look out for aid, a powerful foreign nation, near at hand, is perpetually ready with all its might, to co-operate in the ſubjugation of a power, the object of its envy and the determined foe to its deſigns. The ſeparation of Ireland, the downfall of eſtabliſhment, and the deſtruction of all now held dear by the loyal inhabitants, could not then be far off: and the elevated proſperity of Ireland, with her accumulated wealth and power, could in the end ſerve no other purpoſe, than to promote the ambitious deſigns of a malignant enemy, and, in her own ruin, the more certainly to effect the ruin of Great Britain;—in the downfall of which great nation, not only the loyal proteſtants of Ireland would loſe their grand protector, but the civilized world an example and defence.

The union of theſe kingdoms in the ſame crown, or the ſame executive preſiding over both, conſtitutes a bond of connexion, which has hitherto been preſerved. But the legiſlative power, that which creates law, is the

the ſupreme power in every ſtate: and, in this grand eſſential of ſtate, the moſt vital and the moſt powerful, theſe kingdoms are diſtinct and ſeparate. The legiſlature of Ireland has emphatically aſſerted its compleat diſtinctneſs, by inſiſting on the inſtitution of ſolemn public acts, which accordingly have been made in the parliaments of both countries, whereby the entire independence of the legiſlature of Ireland conſtitutes a ſacred and irrefragable mutual record.

The legiſlature of Ireland, diſtinct and independent, conſults by its diſtinct nature the intereſts only of Ireland: while the Britiſh legiſlature, equally diſtinct and independent, conſults by its diſtinct nature the intereſts only of Great Britain. No doubt, ſo far as a ſenſe of the neceſſity of preſerving the connexion between the two kingdoms may happen to operate upon the two legiſlatures, each will conſult the intereſts of the other country; but from the eſſential nature of diſtinct legiſlatures, ſuch attention to mutual intereſt muſt ultimately refer to the reſpective intereſts of the kingdoms for which they reſpectively legiſlate. In the degree therefore in which the views of the ſeparate legiſlatures, reſpecting the intereſts of their reſpective countries, happen from time to time to be incompatible, the legiſlatures, that is, the reſpective ſupreme powers, muſt act in oppoſition to each other. Such intereſts reſpect not merely a progreſs in national wealth, but *right*, and *privilege*, and every *good, real or imaginary*, which can gratify the ſentiments and raiſe the dignity of a nation. The more important the intereſts from which ariſe incompatible views, the more ſtrenuous and violent muſt be the conſequent oppoſition. The more manifold and compli-

cated

cated thoſe intereſts become, the more frequent and the more incapable of accommodation the contending opinions and claims. If increaſing wealth and power, operating as in all paſt ages, ſhould quicken a jealouſy of intereſt (underſtanding intereſt in the enlarged ſenſe mentioned) and magnify the national pride and ſpirit of independence, the legiſlature, intimately connected with and flowing from the general community, muſt neceſſarily imbibe the ſame ſentiments; which, co-operating with the other cauſes, cannot fail to ripen into deſtructive effect all the ſeeds of diſpute, diſcord, hoſtility, and ſeparation.

Surely no rational man will deny that hiſtory, obſervation, and experience, demonſtrate this to be the nature of man and the neceſſary tendency of human affairs.

It would be an idle as well as tedious diſplay, to take the volume of hiſtory, and extract the innumerable inſtances there recorded, which prove, that in whatever degree provinces or ſtates, connected with, or dependent upon a parent or ſuperiour ſtate, have acquired power and independence, they have diſcovered diſcontent with their connexion, and a deſire to become perfectly diſtinct ſtates; and that whenever that power and independence have grown ſo great as to enable ſuch provinces or ſtates, by their own mere vigour, or with accidental aid, to effect their purpoſe, they have conſtantly aſſerted their perfect diſtinctneſs, and formed themſelves into ſeparate ſtates.

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The ſeparation of the colonies, now the united ſtates of North America, from Great Britain, furniſhes an applicable inſtance. While they were weak and dependent, while a ſenſe of their need of the care and protection of the parent country prevailed, no difficulties embarraſſed the connexion; no diſtinctneſs of intereſt, no provincial pride, pointed to dependence and ſeparation: and yet, the rights aſſerted and the powers exerciſed by the legiſlature of England, and afterwards of Great Britain, over the colonies, had long been more authoritative, and more inconſiſtent with the independence of their aſſemblies,* than thoſe which afterwards ſupplied the occaſion of the unhappy conteſt that ended in ſeparation. Thoſe who knew the colonies intimately, were aware long before the rupture, that the advanced ſtate of proſperity at which they had arrived, with the proud ſpirit of independence which it produced, and which from time to time had ſtrongly manifeſted itſelf, tended powerfully to the ultimate diſſolution of the connexion: and ſeveral plans, among others, plans of union, were ſuggeſted for the purpoſe of preventing it; a modification of ſome one of which might have been adopted, had not untoward circumſtances hurried on the important event. It is not meant either to contend for the right of taxation which Great Britain aſſerted, or to juſtify the colonies in the refuſal of every ſpecifick plan of contribution to the general expence of the empire:—the caſe was difficult;—claims and ſuppoſed intereſts interfered;—and the conſequences followed which might have been apprehended. But the inſtance is adduced, if ſo recent an inſtance were neceſſary

* See Pownall's adminiſtration of the Colonies, ch. 5.

neceſſary to demonſtrate, that the connexion between ſtates, not compleatly incorporated, and not identified in intereſt, becomes precarious and mortal, whenever the inferior ſtate advances ſo far in proſperity, as to aſſert independence, and to rival the ſuperiour ſtate in power.*

It is not eaſy to imagine two connected ſtates to which this reaſoning applies more concluſively than to Geeat Britain and Ireland. They are great and powerful ſtates; which have vaſt, and many, and various connexions and tranſactions with each other and with the reſt of the world; therefore their intereſts are important, manifold, and complicated; and conſequently, the probabilities of incompatible opinions in their ſeparate and independent legiſlatures, reſpecting diſtinct national intereſts, muſt be numerous and weighty; and in the degree that theſe ſtates advance in greatneſs and power, ſuch probabilities become multiplied and approach to certainty. Conceive inſtances of this dangerous nature to have frequently recurred, and that in conſequence an invidious and hoſtile diſpoſition has been created. Every plan of accommodation by ſure

* The ſeparation of the Colonies from Great Britain has happily not proved fatal to either country; perhaps has not actually injured either, excepting the temporary evils of the lamented war: the diſtant ſituation of the United States has preſerved them from becoming the prey of the ambitious power which promoted their ſeparation, as well as from becoming in the hands of that power an inſtrument of deſtruction to the parent country. But Ireland, lying cloſe to Great Britain, through whom Britain can be deſtroyed, upon whom if abandoned France fixes her talons—Ireland, ſo ſituated, ſinks for ever, and Great Britain finally along with her.

conſequence alarms ſuſpicion, and inflames pride; the facility of conſtant diſſenſion neceſſarily follows; and then an unfailing ground is laid for the ſucceſsful intriguing of foreign and domeſtick enemies, who in the meantime will not have neglected, as occaſion favoured, to promote diſcord and diſorder, as the ſure means of the grand ſcheme of ſeparation.*

In this ſtate of the co-equal ſupreme authorities of theſe connected yet independent ſtates, the Britiſh legiſlature may determine that a mighty effort is neceſſary to be made againſt the alarming attempts of an ambitious foe. Admit that the views of ſeparate and independent legiſlatures, now involved in diſſenſions, ſhould be repugnant on a matter ſo eſſential to the exiſtence of the Empire. What muſt follow? Either Britain muſt ſubmit to whatever terms an ambitious power ſhall impoſe, or ſhe muſt maintain alone the cauſe of the Empire. In the firſt caſe, obvious deſtruction quickly ſucceeds. In the latter caſe, it would be impoſſible to permit Ireland to remain neutral:—her power increaſing with rapidity; her people too generally infected with antient hatred repeatedly revived; demagogues through every claſs of ſociety maliciouſly active to make the occaſion fatal; emiſſaries of the enemy concerting

* In the ſeven United Provinces, the French, ever artful and intriguing whatever form they aſſume, had been long buſy in promoting diſcord among the ſtates. Thoſe ſtates in which the burghers chiefly prevailed, were ſet in fierce oppoſition to thoſe in which the Stadtholder and the nobles chiefly had influence; and by degrees their conteſts, inflamed by incendiaries, ſo diſtracted the national councels and efforts, that they have at laſt become wretched and repentant victims to French ambition.

deſtructive

deſtructive plans with the diſaffected;—theſe ſure circumſtances muſt neceſſarily, if not prevented by Great Britain, urge the country beyond the line of neutrality, and add its power to the power of the enemy. Civil conteſt enſues, with certainly a train of ſad calamity, and if Britain ſhould fail, as certainly the ruin of both kingdoms.

This is a ſtrong inſtance; but in the progreſs in national proſperity of theſe kingdoms, many inſtances muſt from time to time occur, tending as certainly, though perhaps not ſo immediately, to hoſtility, ſeparation, and deſtruction. We know that at preſent Ireland enjoys her commerce with the Britiſh colonies, plantations and ſettlements on the expreſs condition, that whatever duties, ſecurities, regulations, and reſtrictions, the Britiſh legiſlature ſhall from time to time think proper to adopt, reſpecting the commerce of Great Britain with the Britiſh colonies, plantations and ſettlements, ſhall be adopted alſo by the legiſlature of Ireland, reſpecting the commerce of Ireland with the ſame colonies, plantations and ſettlements. We alſo know that on many occaſions the ſole and excluſive right of the Iriſh parliament to legiſlate for Ireland in all caſes whatſoever, has been aſſerted in the parliament of Ireland, in the higheſt tone of proud and independence; and that the right of the Britiſh legiſlature to interfere actually or virtually, in any caſe whatſoever, with the legiſlature of Ireland, has been reprobated with indignation. The progreſs of Ireland in thoſe acquiſitions which invigorate the ſpirit of independence, may moſt probably induce the people and parliament of Ireland to conſider, and conſequently to re-

ject, as inimical to their intereſts, and as inconſiſtent with independence, the duties, regulations and reſtrictions alluded to, which new and various circumſtances may lead the parliament of Great Britain to adopt, and which the ſpirit of jealouſy and rivalry may more probably attribute to an invidious diſpoſition in the Britiſh legiſlature, directed againſt the intereſts of Ireland, than to neceſſity and ſound policy. What conſequences enſue? Great Britain refuſes the valuable privilege of trading to and from her colonies, plantations and ſettlements; proud independent and powerful Ireland inſiſts upon the privilege as an indiſputable right, and continues the important commerce: Great Britain, as proud independent and powerful reſiſts the exerciſe of the alleged right:—a train of events ending in deſtruction neceſſarily follows.

Nay farther. Inferring from experience, it may be pronounced, that Great Britain in her imperial courſe, if not prevented by events to be ever deprecated, will extend her Empire and acquire new fields of excluſive commerce. Theſe advantages will be attended with terms and compacts, reſting upon the ſanction, and ultimately modelled by the wiſdom of parliament. In the meantime, diſtinct intereſts, guided by legiſlatures diſtinct and every day virtually more independent, generate frequent commercial jealouſies. The terms and compacts in thoſe new caſes, agreed to and confirmed by the parliament of Great Britain, may, nay, muſt, often militate with the views of ſeparate intereſt, and the diſtinct national prejudices, of the parliament of Ireland. At the ſame time party leaders of every deſcription, whether actuated by ambition, enthuſiaſm, or diſaffection,

magnify

magnify and inflame diſagreement. Ireland muſt yield, and thereby acknowledge dependence; or the two ſtates muſt be committed. The conſequences, it is plain, would either immediately or by ſure gradations, involve the ſeries of deſtruction we are ſolicitous to prevent.

Auother point of view may be ſuggeſted. A ſpirit of reform appears to have taken poſſeſſion of the minds of great numbers in this country, even of many who are ſincerely attached to our conſtitution civil and religious. The meaſure of reform has been occaſionally propoſed in the legiſlature of Great Britain; and there are many reſpectable characters in that country who think that ſome reform, in a leſs turbulent and more auſpicious ſeaſon, might be uſefully adopted. In Great Britain, from the union of the people, from the general attachment to the eſtabliſhed laws and religion, and from the deep and ſteady intereſt which all ranks feel in the preſervation of their conſtitution, it is morally certain, that whatever reform may take place there, will be moderate, cautious, and conſtitutional. But in Ireland, where the principles of jacobiniſm have been ſo deeply imbibed and ſo extenſively propagated, and where the antipathies of contending ſects, and the jealouſy of Engliſh dominion, have ſo long fermented in the community, there is powerful reaſon to apprehend, that, the opinions of a diſtinct nation influencing a diſtinct legiſlature, the independence of the parliament of Ireland would exhibit itſelf, in the adoption of a reform, different from that in Great Britain. Reform, by its own nature, has a tendency to beget reform; but among an unſteady people, not ſtrongly attached to eſtabliſhed laws, it propagates

pagates more rapidly and more daringly. The natural conſequence of ſuch progreſs muſt be, that the reforms of the two ſtates, would in due courſe ſo far diverge, as neceſſarily to produce the ſeparation which our enemies purſue, but which we anxiouſly ſeek to avoid.

This may perhaps be anſwered by ſuggeſting, that the oppoſition parties in the two ligiſlatures have very well underſtood each other on the ſubject of reform; and that they not only concerted together the means of carrying their purpoſe in a parliamentary way, but the oppoſition in England were employed to take up the cauſe of the Iriſh conſpiracy in the Britiſh parliament, whereby, had they ſucceeded in their profeſſed views, the rebellion would have gained countenance and ſtrength, reſiſtance on the part of the executive would have been retarded and weakened, Ireland might have been loſt, and Great Britain at laſt have become a victim to the ſchemes of jacobiniſm. A proof this, as demonſtrative as matters of a political nature admit, that ſeparate and independent legiſlatures in one Empire, tend to diſunion and weakneſs, muſt often prove embarraſſing and dangerous, and, in a period of great political movement among ſurrounding nations, may occaſion actual deſtruction. Think but for a moment on the leading circumſtances of theſe two kingdoms :—ſo peculiarly ſituated on the maps of Europe; ſo ſlightly connected, yet ſo eſſentially diſtinct; ſo different in the prevailing through the ſame in the eſtabliſhed religion; ſo expoſed to machinations at home and to hoſtilities from abroad; but particularly, the inferior country, hitherto dependent, now ſo progreſſive in power and independence;—and then ſay, is it poſſible, from all that we know of

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the hiſtory and nature of man, to conceive that, without a miracle, two kingdoms ſo circumſtanced, can continue long in any amicable or uſeful connexion, or can avoid ultimately a hoſtile ſeparation.

Great Britain and Ireland, all the loyal are agreed, ought to be one in the enjoyment of the ſame conſtitution, and one in a common intereſt: and in truth, it has been the regret of the beſt friends to Ireland, that whether from a leſs advanced ſtate of ſociety, or from the unhappy difference in religion, or from whatever cauſes, the Britiſh conſtitution has not been ſo compleatly enjoyed, or ſo compleatly operative, here as in Great Britain; and we all know that the intereſts of the two countries, have been too generally conſidered and acted upon, as diſtinct and even incompatible. But while the legiſlatures, the ſupreme powers in the two nations, remain ſeparate and independent, no common ſyſtem can poſſibly operate to preſerve a common intereſt, and to ſupport and improve a common conſtitution. Separate legiſlatures therefore, differently connected, and differently intereſted, muſt neceſſarily, ſo far as they are independent, adopt different views and ſentiments on thoſe leading points. And accordingly, within a few years paſt, while virtual dependence ſtill remained, though no doubt conſiderably weakened, we have found this concluſion palpably verified on two important occaſions; and what is remarkable, thoſe occaſions occurred after, and not very long after, the repeal of the Britiſh ſtatute which declared the right of the Britiſh legiſlature to bind Ireland, and the renunciation of the right itſelf. The firſt of thoſe differences of deciſion in the two legiſlatures, was upon a ſubject of commercial

compact

compact and regulation, which, if it could have been effected, would, in the opinion of thoſe who beſt underſtand the intereſts of this country, and who were moſt attached to the connexion between the two kingdoms, have materially contributed to prevent the dangers of diſunion, and to promote mutual cordiality and benefit. But the ſubject being of a nature which neceſſarily led to the diſcuſſion of the diſtinct intereſt, and the conſtitutional rights and independence of Ireland, and conſequently a ſubject into which jealouſy and pride eaſily intruded, party ſpirit, ſupported by a zealous popularity, had full opportunity to operate, and ſucceeded in defeating a meaſure of great publick utility. The other was an occaſion of greater moment. But becauſe, among the leſſer cabals of jealouſy and rivalry, it ſtands pre-eminent as a ſucceſsful inſtance of dangerous advantage taken of a ſtate of political weakneſs in Great Britain, it has been treated lightly as a ſolitary example: yet, when ſo ſoon after the confirmation of the compleat independence of the Iriſh legiſlature, we find a vaſt majority prepared to commit the executive authority into the hands of a regency, with powers materially diſtinct from thoſe then about to be limited by the Britiſh legiſlature, we rationally conclude, notwithſtanding all that has been ſaid of the operation of good ſenſe and regard to mutual good, that whenever new occaſions ſhould ariſe, the ſame ſpirit of independence, grown more confirmed and vigorous, and actuated by the conſtantly operating motives of ambition, ſelf-intereſt and party zeal, would impel to ſimilarly dangerous conduct, but probably with deſtructive effect. We ſay, the ſame ſpirit of independence;—becauſe, although it is well known, that the ſubſequent conduct of that majority,

too

too clearly evinced other motives of action, yet, had the parliament of Ireland been ſubject to the ſame dependence and controul as formerly, the act of the Britiſh parliament would have bound Ireland in a matter of ſuch imperial concern, and no ſuch embarraſſing and alarming event could have taken place: beſides, though an independent ſpirit in the individual is always attended with other valuable qualities, yet, in party commotion, we often find the meaneſt characters rallying round the ſtandard of independence with hollow and deſtructive views; juſt as, among the jacobin preachers on political purity and bliſs, we daily ſee cold-blooded theoriſts, whoſe individual benevolence is waſted in their univerſal philanthropy.

Such an unhappy cauſe as then made a regency neceſſary might eaſily be of very long continuance, during which wars and conſpiracies might eaſily afflict the country. Theſe kingdoms, in the midſt of danger and diſtraction, would then labour under the additional embarraſſment, of being governed, not only by ſeparate legiſlatures, but by diſtinct and inconſiſtent executive authorities: And upon the ſame principles which enabled the legiſlature of Ireland, to inveſt the regency with powers diſtinct from thoſe limited by the legiſlature of Great Britain, a different *perſon* might be entruſted with thoſe powers, whereby the rage of party would aggravate and enforce all the diſtraction and inconſiſtency of diſtinct legiſlative and executive authorities. The occaſions for diſſenſion between the legiſlatures are as numerous as the ſubject matters of legiſlation which touch both kingdoms. Such ſubject matters multiply with the progreſs of theſe nations and of ſurrounding ſtates; and

the probability as well as danger of diſſenſion, riſe with the importance of the matter, and in the degree that it involves the intereſts and ſentiments of the community. To the immenſe horde of jacobins and ſeparatiſts, legiſlative diſſentions give alarming force; they increaſe their numbers, diſunite the loyal, and furniſh legalized ground for intrigue, conſpiracy, and all the political machinations that ultimately threaten the national exiſtence. In the probable recurrence therefore, of differences between the two legiſlatures upon important ſubjects, the moſt ſtrenuous oppoſers of union acknowledge manifeſt danger to the imperial ſtate; and propoſe to guard againſt ſuch recurrence by compacts, which ſhall provide, that whenever the legiſlature of Great Britain ſhall adopt certain important meaſures, the legiſlature of Ireland ſhall be bound to concur: and as a commencement and a ſpecimen, an idle and inefficacious bill was introduced laſt ſeſſion, with the profeſſed purpoſe of ſupplying ſuppoſed defects in the exiſting laws, reſpecting the matter of regency, and of preventing in future, the poſſibility of difference between the two legiſlatures, upon any queſtion ſimilar to that which ſo nearly committed theſe kingdoms in 1789. All ſuch remedies, however, are as futile as they are inconſiſtent with the now loudly profeſſed principles of thoſe who propoſe them, and are calculated for no other purpoſe than to rouſe the ſpirit of independence into diſorder and violence. By the act of annexation, the king of England enjoys the title and prerogatives of king of Ireland by virtue of his being king of England, and the crown of Ireland is expreſsly united and knit to the imperial crown of the realm of England. Now, as has been juſtly and incontrovertibly obſerved, the crown,

that

that is, the executive authority ruling the realm of Ireland, can be, by virtue of this act, no other than the executive authority ruling the realm of England; and consequently, the person exercising that authority in both realms must be the same, and invested with the same prerogatives or powers. But the person who shall enjoy the royal authority, the line of succession in which it shall descend, and the regulation and limitation of its powers, are subject to the controul of the British legislature: and therefore, in every new case that can happen respecting royalty, the parliament of Ireland, by the act of annexation, is bound to await the decision of the parliament of Great Britain.* The case of regency was fully provided for. But if any explanation or confirmation was wanting, the act of the Irish legislature in 1782, whereby it is enacted, that no bill shall pass into a law in Ireland unless it be returned under the great seal of Great Britain, was fully adequate to convince the parliament of Ireland, that until the regent was appointed and invested by the British legislature, they could not, consistently with their own settled principles of connexion, proceed one step in the important business, but were bound merely to recognise the decisions of the parliament of Great Britain on that subject: and indeed it is remarkable to recollect, that in the debate on the regency in the year 1789, the force of this act was strenuously urged by a gentleman in office, who on that occasion, acted such a manly, disinterested,

* See a condensed demonstrative and eloquent speech, delivered by William Johnson, Esq; in the debate on the regency bill, last session of parliament.

and loyal part, as then gained him deſerved reſpect, and will ever reflect upon him true honour.

" His loyalty he kept, his love, his zeal;
" Nor number, nor example with him wrought
" To ſwerve from truth, or change his conſtant mind—"

yet, in defiance of law, remonſtrance, and conſiſtency, the popular paramount principle, that independent Ireland ought not to be bound formally or virtually in any caſe whatſoever, by the Britiſh legiſlature, influenced a full parliamentary aſſembly of Ireland, ſeconded by whatever other motives, to commit to hazard the harmony and deareſt intereſt of both ſtates. But we are notwithſtanding, told moſt confidently, that this act of the year 1782 effectually ſecures union and connexion on a firm and laſting baſe, becauſe forſooth it makes the Britiſh miniſter anſwerable to the Britiſh nation, if any law ſhould receive the royal aſſent in Ireland, which could in any way injure the empire, be incompatible with its imperial intereſts, or tend to ſeparate Ireland.* The royal negative is a prerogative of a very delicate nature, and the right has lain ſo long unexercised, that in an ordinary caſe it would have become obſolete and extinguiſhed. Differences may occur between the concurrent determinations of the two houſes of parliament and the real intereſts of the nation, in which the king's diſſent may rightfully and uſefully intervene for the publick good: yet even theſe caſes muſt be attended with great clearneſs; for otherwiſe, parliament and the king might be committed in a doubtful ſtruggle for predominance, of the ſad effects of which, Great Britain once had fatal experience. But delicate and dangerous

* The Speaker's Speech, page 24.

as muſt always be the caſes, wherein this prerogative interferes between the parliament and the nation, of infinitely greater alarm would any caſe prove, in which the prerogative ſhould be called into exerciſe between the legiſlatures of the two kingdoms. What would the independent legiſlature of Ireland regard the reſponſibility of the Britiſh miniſter? How eaſily could they vote any man an enemy to his country, who ſhould dare to ſupport the right of the crown of England, or the right of the miniſter to adviſe the crown, to ſuppreſs the concurrent determination of both houſes of the parliament of Ireland, as they formerly voted any man an enemy to his country, who ſhould dare to enforce the right of the tithe of agiſtment, whereby the burthen was thrown upon the potatoes of the poor, in that great province where grazing has chiefly prevailed? The very circumſtance, of the Britiſh miniſter adviſing his majeſty to, refuſe the royal aſſent to a bill paſſed by the Iriſh parliament, would inevitably inflame the legiſlature, and rouſe the nation of Ireland. Would the Britiſh miniſter be acknowledged a better or fitter judge of the intereſt of Ireland, or even of imperial intereſts, than the co-equal and independent legiſlature of Ireland? Would not the miniſter be rather repreſented as acting under the influence of the Britiſh legiſlature, as ſacrificing the intereſts of Ireland to thoſe of Britain, and as inſulting the dignity and independence of a diſtinct kingdom? Would there be no pſeudo-patriots, no factious demagogues in parliament, and no jacobin ſeparatiſts and conſpirators out of parliament, ready to fan the flame, and to haſten the conflagration of two great ſtates? It would be idle to purſue farther a matter ſo palpable. But, the weakneſs of the confident concluſion alleded

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to, as well as of ſeveral others, of an extraordinary nature, delivered to parliament in a high tone of popular authority*, has been ingeniouſly expoſed by an able member of parliament, who early ſupported with manly eloquence, in the face of prejudice, the utility of legiſlative union.† It is evident, however, that the compacts and proviſions whereby the legiſlature of Ireland ſhould be bound to adopt the acts of the Britiſh legiſlature, muſt be as wide as the whole ſphere of imperial concerns; for otherwiſe, whatever remained would leave the two legiſlatures ſo far expoſed to all the conſequences of difference, upon the innumerable and weighty imperial concerns which muſt ariſe in the imperial and diſtinct progreſs of two powerful, proud, and independent kingdoms. But, to adopt ſuch remedies, would be, to make Ireland virtually a dependent province of the empire, limited to its own internal legiſlation; and in truth, they would ſoon effect no other purpoſe, than to produce new and more alarming differences, and furniſh opportunities to the multitude of ſeparatiſts, to perpetuate their deſigns: for, it is inconſiſtent with the plaineſt reaſon, that as Ireland advances in riches and power, her ſentiments of dignity and independence will become leſs vivid and active; or that

* Among others—that, becauſe it has been found uſeful in the Britiſh conſtitution, that to the creation of law, the concurrence of ſeveral branches of the ſame legiſlature or ſupreme authority ſhould be neceſſary, therefore it may be uſeful, that in the ſame empire or ſtate ſhould exiſt two ſupreme and independent authorities, equally inveſted with the power of making law in all reſpects whatſoever. This ſurely needs only to be announced.

† See a review of a publication, entitled, the Speech of the Right Hon. John Foſter, by William Smith, Eſq.

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the legiſlature, which, under the influence of national ſentiment, formerly commanded the repeal of the ſixth of George the firſt, would not contend for the honour, and the paramount right, of deciding on all the eſſential concerns of the Imperial ſtate, equally with the legiſlature of Great Britain.

Let it not be ſaid (it is too offenſive to the plaineſt underſtanding) that good ſenſe and mutual intereſt and affection have ſecured and will ever ſecure the connexion and harmony of theſe kingdoms.* The degree of good ſenſe and benevolence floating in any community, would operate to very little effect, in preſerving the harmony or even the exiſtence of an individual ſtate, if there was not a ſupreme authority veſted in ſome part of it, ſufficiently powerful to enforce neceſſary regulations, and to deter or repreſs the deſtructive efforts of folly, paſſion, and vice. Still leſs can good ſenſe and fleeting ſentiment ſecure, or have they ever ſecured, the harmony of diſtinct ſtates, which happen to be ſo ſituated or related, that queſtions of national intereſt, and diſtinct national claims, make frequent ſubjects for diſcuſſion and adjuſtment. The legiſlature of Ireland has adopted the exiſting navigation laws enacted by the Britiſh legiſlature, and the parliament of Great Britain has permitted the importation of colonial produce from Ireland, therefore we are aſſured that all ſubjects of jealouſy and contention are for ever done away, and that every thing which human wiſdom can deviſe has been effected for the perpetual ſecurity of

* See the Speaker's Speech, page 51.

out

our connexion. But theſe acts of the reſpective legiſlatures have effected no more than daily takes place between ſtates which happen to be in amity, but between which incompatible intereſts and inveterate antipathy create frequent and bitter wars. Regulations, apparently for mutual intereſt, are agreed upon and ratified. They may be obſerved for a long time, and produce mutual benefit; but when new caſes ariſe, contending intereſts occur, or different parties rule, the fabrick of amity diſſolves, and diſſenſion and hoſtility rage unconfined. *That* government muſt ſurely be acknowledged beſt, which provides for the moſt and worſt contingencies, and which moſt effectually guards againſt the diſorders produced by human paſſions. Every day, new ſubjects of difference, and calling for adjuſtment, muſt by neceſſity ariſe between great and diſtinct nations, whoſe ſituations involve them in many important relations; and in every one of theſe differences muſt as neceſſarily mingle all the plottings and workings of ambition, party ſpirit, ſelf intereſt, and wicked cunning. Identity of intereſt and identity of dominion and controul, therefore, can alone permanently preſerve the harmony and connexion of great and independent ſtates. The inſtances of diſſenſion and incompatible pretenſions, which have occurred within the few years of declared independence, proclaim aloud the danger of future diſcord: the progreſs of theſe nations accumulates matter for diſcord: ſociety is every where impregnated with principles hoſtile to political harmony: and an enemy bent upon our ruin, watches, and will ever watch the moments of our weakneſs and diſunion. It

would

would be the madneſs of folly not to deſcry and pervent the danger before deſtruction becomes inevitable.

In whatever contentions in parliament from time to time take place, the ſelf intereſt and the influence of the ſuperior country muſt, nay actually do, conſtitute the ſubjects for reſiſtance and popular harangue. The more independent and powerful the inferior country, the more univerſally and fatally national intereſt and national pride become neceſſarily rouſed, by this perpetually, recurring cauſe of diſcontent and diſunion; eſpecially when inflamed by all thoſe arts which the political adventurer and the factious demagogue employ, and which in no former days were employed with more deſtructive effect. Have ancient cauſes, in barbarous time, created hate? Have mutual injuries occaſionally revived and aggravated antipathy? All are viciouſly diſplayed, painted with invidious colouring, and converted into pretexts, for infuſing and diſſeminating, every opinion and principle, baneful to uſeful or permanent connexion.

Who can pretend to be blind to the effects which muſt follow to two diſtinct and powerful nations, whoſe deepeſt intereſt requires that they ſhould uniformly act as one, but between whom, in former times, ſo many ſad cauſes of offence and rancour ſubſiſted, and in whoſe independent claims, various purſuits, and increaſing greatneſs, lurk ſo many contingencies fruitful of diſcord?

The uniformly operating principles of our nature aſſure us, that the jealouſy of diſtinct intereſt will progreſſively aggravate theſe alarming tendencies. *That* jealouſy has frequently been rouſed, as we have all ſeen, and as we have been aſſured by the leading oppoſer of Union. *That* jealouſy muſt increaſe (as we have been told by the ſame authority) with two independent legiſlatures; it muſt ſtill farther increaſe as the objects of intereſt become more numerous and important; and, national intereſt is ſo interwoven with political regulation, that common ſenſe concurs with the ſame authority in concluding, that without a united intereſt, political union will receive many ſhocks, and ſeparation of intereſt muſt threaten ſeparation of connexion.

What can prevent a progreſs of this nature from terminating in deſtruction, but an overbearing influence, which in its turn, creates new diſguſt, indiſpoſitions to mutual amity, and prevents the two kingdoms from gaining the full effect of thoſe advantages with which nature and cultivation have ſupplied them.

If, however, compleat Union cannot be effected, the only hope then remaining for the permanency of our connexion is, that the virtual dependence of the legiſlature of Ireland upon the legiſlature of Great Britain may be inviolably ſecured. The executive, as has been obſerved, is no doubt the immediate inſtrument to ſecure that dependence; but the executive can act only by the aid and under the controul of the ſupreme power, the legiſlature of the ſtate: and it is too plain for controverſy, that unleſs the legiſlature of Ireland had been ultimately controuled by the ſupreme power

of

of Great Britain, and rendered to all ſubſtantial effect dependent, Ireland could not have been preſerved in that connexion which has been deemed neceſſary to the well being and even exiſtence of both kingdoms. Party rage, joined to popular commotion, and aided by foreign intrigue and power, muſt in ſome of the many periods of difficulty, have long ſince produced ſeparation, or ſuch ſubjection as is totally inconſiſtent with any degree of publick proſperity.

But the growth of this country has been ſuch, as at length to reſiſt and ſpurn dependence. It has rivalled the ſuperiour, or as it may ſubſtantially be called, the Parent Country, and has claimed, almoſt enforced, a perfect equality of rights: and the legiſlatures are now profeſſedly and by ſolemn declaration compleatly independent, and, if ſuch an expreſſion can properly be uſed, equally ſupreme. There is therefore no rightful dependence whatſoever, no avowed regular means by which to preſerve the neceſſary dependence; and conſequently, the means to be uſed muſt be irregular, unjuſtifiable, and offenſive, and ſuch as cannot fail to furniſh additional cauſes of diſcontent and diſſenſion. The growth of diſtinct Ireland in power, muſt certainly render this dependence the more precarious, and conſequently, render means more powerful neceſſary. Ireland, advancing in power and dignity, could not but feel and act as all other nations have felt and acted in ſimilar ſituations. Her people, through all their ranks, would imbibe the ſpirit of reſiſtance. We are well aware how, and by whom, the occaſion would be improved; and looking at the preſent transformed ſtate

of ſurrounding nations, we cannot think on the conſequences without the deepeſt anxiety.

To whatever ſide we turn, we are aſſailed by new difficulties and diſtractions, and can find no ground on which to build a ſtable hope of laſting and uſeful connexion, while the ſupreme authorities in the imperial ſtate remain diſtinct. But by a Union of the two legiſlatures, liberally and wiſely adjuſted, in which the eſſence and form of the Britiſh conſtitution ſhould be compleatly preſerved, every ground for recurrence to former offences and annimoſities, or to their unhappy effects, and all jealouſy ariſing from diſtinct national intereſt and diſtinct national pride, would be for ever done away. The only influence then to be exerciſed, would be that of the executive, flowing from and maintained by the conſtitution, for the purpoſe of preſerving the neceſſary equipoiſe of the ſeveral powers and orders of the one great ſtate, and of carrying on with promptitude and effect the neceſſary meaſures of national concern. There could not then be diſtinct laws for different parts of the ſame Empire; but in like manner as the great ſecurity of the civil liberty of the ſubject, under the Britiſh Conſtitution, conſiſts in this unalterable fact, that whatever laws the members of the legiſlature enact, bind themſelves and all their intereſts and connexions, equally with thoſe for whom they legiſlate, ſo the laws to be enacted in the common legiſlature, could not bind or affect any diſtrict or diviſion of the united kingdoms excluſively, but muſt equally affect all and every part, and by uniform operation, produce not a diſtinct but a common intereſt; and in conformity with the opinion of the late Doctor Franklin,

Franklin, reſpecting Great Britain and the colonies, we might expect, "that by ſuch a Union the people of "Great Britain and the people [of Ireland] would "learn to conſider themſelves, not as belonging to dif-"ferent communities with different intereſts, but to one "community with one intereſt; which would contribute "to ſtrengthen the whole, and greatly leſſen the danger "of future ſeparations."*

The members to be ſent by Ireland to the common legiſlature of the two kingdoms, would be conſiderably leſs in number than the preſent legiſlature of Ireland; the members for the commons, as we have now good reaſon to believe, would be chiefly, if not entirely, choſen by the counties and great towns; while the lords of parliament would be choſen by the great body of the nobility: the repreſentation for Ireland therefore, would contain at once, the higheſt birth the moſt independent property, the beſt education, and the firſt abilities. Such a number of leading characters, deeply intereſted in the welfare of the country, and placed on ſo conſpicuous a theatre, could not ſee, with indifference or without reſiſtance, any attempts of palpable partiality or injuſtice: and truly, any attempts of ſuch a nature muſt be palpable indeed; for, what would they be? They would be attempts in a common legiſlature, to act the part of a ſeparate, nay hoſtile legiſlature: and certainly, great ingenuity as well as great violence would be neceſſary, to enact laws, calculated to ~~deſerve~~ diſcover one third of the common territory, for the purpoſe of ſerving the remaining part. Indeed ſuch a ſyſtem ſeems to be

* See his Letter to Governor Shirley, dated 22nd Dec. 1754.

impoſſible

impoſſible in its own nature: for, ſo nearly ſimilar, in all the leading features and circumſtances, has nature formed and placed theſe iſlands, that it is not in human power to frame a regulation, which ſhould ſerve Great Britain at large, and which would not alſo ſerve Ireland at large, or a regulation which ſhould diſſerve Ireland at large, and which would not diſſerve Great Britain at large. No doubt laws could be conceived which might ſerve ſome particular town or towns, diſtrict or diſtricts, of either country, to the detriment of the great remaining part of both countries. But in a parliament compoſed of the leading intereſts of the united kingdoms, in which ſo many of the moſt liberal and enlightened characters of the age would always act a commanding part, it is not in human credulity to believe, that the local intereſt, the narrow policy, of a particular town or diſtrict, could influence the lords and commons, in violation of reaſon, in defiance of opinion, in deſtruction of the common intereſt, and in diminution of national ſtreugth, to conſpire in ſacrificing the great to the little, the whole to a part.

All reaſoning from what the parliament of Great Britain has done, or would probably do, as a ſeparate legiſlature, is totally inapplicable to the preſent ſubject, even if all were founded that has been invidiouſly inſinuated.

In all ſuch caſes, a ſeparate legiſlature guards and promotes a ſeparate intereſt; and the laws deemed partial, operate by way of privilege and protection, in favour of the ſubjects of a diſtinct kingdom, as againſt a foreign ſtate, ſo far as a diſtinct intereſt is concerned.

But a united parliament can have no ſeparate intereſt to conſult. The whole united people of Great Britain and Ireland become the ſubjects of its legiſlative care: in its compoſition would be found not only the proper repreſentation of Ireland, but alſo many reſpectable repreſentatives for Great Britain, as deeply intereſted in their own property for the peculiar welfare of Ireland as for that of Great Britain: the ſubject matters to be diſcuſſed would be ſubjects of common intereſt, could be preſented only in that form, and muſt preclude all invidious debate as between diſtinct ſtates: while the frequency of deliberation on the common intereſt of the ſubjects of both iſlands, could not fail, operating by the ſure principle of habit, to create and ſtrengthen in the legiſlature, the ſentiment and principle of a common intereſt, and by neceſſity diffuſe the ſentiment and principle through the conſtituent body, the whole united community.

Two mighty inſtances indeed have been vehemently urged and idly repeated, not of partial laws, but of laws unjuſtly, as it is ſaid, and in breach of faith, enacted as againſt Scotland in the parliament of Great Britain; and theſe are relied on as proof, that the intereſts of Ireland as well as of Scotland, would be ſacrificed after a Union, to the intereſts of England. But theſe inſtances have been ſo clearly and repeatedly proved to be unfounded, that it would be tedious, as it is unneceſſary, to repeat, or to add to, the refutation. It may be proper however to remark, that from the part taken by the Scotch members of parliament in the matter of the malt tax, it cannot eaſily be ſhewn, that they were indifferent to the intereſts of their particular country;

country; nor in truth can it be ſhewn, that in any matter in which the intereſts of Scotland have come into diſcuſſion, the Scotch repreſentatives have not ſtrenuouſly ſupported them. The proceeding on the occaſion of the malt tax proves to have been merely an effort of the then oppoſition, to give to a quibble more effect than to ſubſtantial and equal juſtice. The act which placed Scotland on the ſame footing as England in reſpect to the law of high treaſon, is acknowledged by thoſe who invidiouſly adduce it, to have been for the benefit of Scotland; while on examination it appears to have been enacted in exact purſuance of an article of the Union. We may therefore, in oppoſition to modern calumny, continue to give credit to the moſt reſpectable hiſtorians of the times ſubſequent to the Union, who concur in teſtimony, to the good faith and impartiality of the parliament of Great Britain in obſervance of the compact, as well as to the many and laſting benefits which have reſulted to Scotland from the Union, notwithſtanding the gloomy and inflammatory forebodings (long ſince falſified) of Lochart, Fletcher and Lord Belhaven.

The leader of the oppoſition to Union is ſo ſenſible of the failure of all ſuch inſtances in proving a breach of compact, that, in the whole of his long ſpeech, he pretends not to adduce or to ſupport one: and even when he attempts to ſhew ~~theſe,~~ that by the income tax the articles of Union are virtually broken, ~~ye the~~ diſavows any inſinuation that the meaſure is a breach of any article of the Union, or that it was intended to evade it.* The

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* Speaker's Speech, page 96.

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weakneſs and futility of his endeavour to ſhew that by this meaſure the articles of union are virtually broken, ſerve to confirm rather than weaken our reliance on a united legiſlature. He ſays, that by annihilating the meaſure of a land tax, another is raiſed by the name of the income tax. But the land tax is not annihilated; it remains ſubſtantially as it was; it is merely diſpoſed of in order to raiſe a large principal ſum for the exigencies of the ſtate; and whether the proprietor of an eſtate purchaſes in, or continues to pay the tax, is to all real effect the ſame. But if it were annihilated, the effect would be the ſame in Scotland as in England: the tax according to the proportions agreed on at the union would be done away as to both countries: and all other taxes, whatever they were or might be, would remain the ſame. But how the annihilation of the land tax, ſuppoſing it annihilated, produced the income tax, is moſt inconceivable. The large ſum ariſing from the ſale of the land tax, we ſhould more naturally expect, would have precluded the neceſſity of the income tax; for the income tax has not been raiſed to pay the intereſt of loans, or in any reſpect to ſtand in the place of ordinary taxes, but is expreſsly adopted in place of a loan, and ſo far to preclude the neceſſity of loan or of permanent taxes. The propoſition therefore is as inconſiſtent as it is unfounded, and by the by is equally irrelevant. The lands of Scotland, by the articles of Union, were, he ſays, to pay only one-fortieth of the Britiſh land tax; but he adds, an income tax has taken place; and income ariſes out of land; and eſtimating Scotland in her income at one-eighth of England, her lands will therefore pay henceforward one-eighth inſtead of one-fortieth of what thoſe of England do.

Now, in order to give any ſemblance of reaſon to this argument, it muſt be previouſly ſhewn that the proportion of land tax for Scotland, was at the Union, moſt abſurdly and unjuſtly, adopted as the ratio of all other taxes to be paid by Scotland; for no tax was ever invented, or can be conceived, which is not paid out of income; and whether a man pays a certain amount, by the name of an income tax, in the form of one-tenth of his revenues, or in the form of taxes upon conſumption, window lights, hearth money, or the like, makes not to common ſenſe the ſlighteſt difference. But we know, for we are accurately informed by the hiſtorians of that day, that the proportion of land tax was not adopted as the ratio of other contributions, but was merely a regulation of that particular tax then ſubſiſting in Englaud, adopted according to circumſtances. Many objections had been made as to the different modes in the two countries of valuing the lands, of ſetting them, of the payment of rents, and of levying and paying in the ſums charged upon land; which rendered it difficult to adjuſt this tax equitably by any rate or valuation; and therefore, to accommodate all differences, and to ſmooth the way for ſo deſirable a purpoſe as they were about to accompliſh, the commiſſioners agreed that, as to this particular tax, whenever it ſhould be laid on, Scotland ſhould pay a certain fixed ſum, in the event of England paying another certain ſum, and ſo in proportion. But this mode of regulating a particular tax was never till now dreamt of as a ſtandard for regulating any other taxes, whether called cuſtoms, exciſe, aſſeſſment, or contributions of income. Be the land tax exiſting or annihilated, diſpoſed of for a principal ſum, or remaining as a tax with government, all other taxes remain

main as before, and regulated in the long uſed and acknowledged way. This inſinuation therefore, or diſavowal of an inſinuation, inſtead of ſerving, mars the purpoſe for which it is inſinuated.

There is no reaſon then for apprehenſion, that the legiſlature of a great nation, like united Britain and Ireland, would ſacrifice the intereſts of one great and eſſential part to thoſe of another; nor, if the apprehenſion were rational, can it be conceived, that the executive could countenance ſuch abſurd ſchemes, evidently deſtructive of the well-being and ſafety of the whole over which it preſides, and tending to weaken as well as degrade the government: but even if the vicious folly were poſſible, a penetrating and active oppoſition, joined to the members for the great portion of the ſtate, againſt which the weak and wicked conſpiracy would be formed, muſt expoſe and defeat ſuch wild attempts.

In the preſent ſtate of connexion indeed, which becomes neceſſarily more ſlight and precarious as Ireland becomes mighty, mighty to deſtroy as well as to ſupport Great Britain, it would not be ſurpriſing if the Britiſh legiſlature were to conſider the intereſt of the two countries as incompatible. An invidious ſpirit has been long carefully kept alive among us; and, whatever has been ſuppoſed to ſerve the intereſts of Great Britain, has been generally repreſented, for that reaſon, as baneful to the intereſts of Ireland. Hence the cry for non-importation agreements, and the demands of prohibitory duties, hoſtile bounties, and the like; which, ſo far as carried into practice, have hurt our own valu-

able exports in a far greater degree than they have diminiſhed the imports from Britain; and at the ſame time have been productive of jealouſy and hoſtile regulations on the other ſide: a ſpirit and a conduct on the part of both, no doubt, almoſt equally deſtructive.*

But if we conſider the political principles, peculiarly inimical to Britain and the Britiſh conſtitution, ſo ſedulouſly propagated, which have not only poſſeſſed the unthinking maſs of our people, but have put in motion ſo many of the educated; if we add the unfortunately divided ſtate of this country as to religion; and then review the deſtructive progreſs of France through Europe, and recollect her malignity to Britain as the grand obſtacle to her deſigns; can any rational underſtanding conclude, that it remains the intereſt of Great Britain, to regard the intereſt of Ireland as her own, and to uſe every mean for the promotion of a diſtinct proſperity, which neceſſarily conferring power, may ultimately exalt an implacable foe, upon the ruins of that grand ſyſtem of civilization, which it has coſt induſtry, wiſdom, and patriotiſm, ages to erect?

On the contrary, if the repreſentatives from every part of theſe iſlands, conſtitute the legiſlature for the whole of Great Britain and Ireland, all the acts of which equally affect both united kingdoms, then are the intereſts of all ſo bound up together, that the motives which have hitherto influenced the legiſlatures for the diſtinct kingdoms, to prefer diſtinct intereſts, are wholly taken away: nay, the ſubject matter no longer remains;

* See Lord Sheffield's Obſervations on the Trade of Ireland.

for

for there can be no ſeparate national intereſt in any part or member of a conſolidated ſtate, the national intereſt and the common intereſt being then one and the ſame. The laws cannot operate partially; for the ſame laws are made for the whole, and there is no ſeparate intereſt to be promoted. Partial regards and invidious conſiderations affect the laws of neighbouring ſtates; for the intereſts of neighbouring ſtates have been, from the beginning of time, almoſt conſtantly in oppoſition: but in one undivided ſtate, the national intereſt, the grand object of legiſlation, being the ſame, partial regards as oppoſed to a common intereſt, howſoever they may influence individuals, cannot materially affect the general law. We do not find that partial attachments operate in the legiſlature of Great Britain, to the detriment of any part, or to the benefit of any part, in oppoſition to the common intereſt; but, whatever may be the ſtruggles of party for political power, and whatever differences of opinion on publick meaſures may take place, we never hear of the intereſt of any particular diſtrict being oppoſed to the national proſperity. Partial attachments muſt ever be various in a numerous legiſlature, and therefore counteract each other: beſides, the fear of ſucceſsful oppoſition to partial meaſures; reſpect for opinion; regard for a common cauſe, which the habits of conſulting on the grand ſubjects of publick policy naturally beget; the uſeful intermixture of opinions, flowing from conſtant intercourſe and diſcuſſion; theſe, and innumerable combinations of ſimilar nature, concur to create, union of views, and union of exertion, to a common good.

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In ſuch a conſolidation of intereſts, the proſperity and power of every part, form the proſperity and power, and contribute to the ſtability of the whole. Conſequently, in the United legiſlature, engaged in advancing the wealth and greatneſs, not of a ſeparate ſtate, but of one undivided and inſeparable ſtate, every encouragement that an enlightened zeal for national intereſt could give, would be extended to every beneficial exertion of every part of the perfectly United Empire. The United parliament would be compoſed, not of a narrow ariſtocracy attended by a tribe of devoted and uninformed dependents, but of the numerous great intereſts of the United kingdoms, aided by the various and extenſive information of every profeſſion, art, and occupation, of a moſt active, proſperous and enlightened nation. Unembarraſſed by the contending claims of diſtinct and rival ſtates, ſuch a legiſlature, therefore, would be at once actuated by motive and furniſhed with ability, to call forth every latent power, and to cheriſh every riſing effort, in the promotion of particular, and conſequently of general, induſtry and proſperity. One part of a great ſtate, from produce, ſituation, or habit, is often capable of cultivating a valuable art, which is, both phyſically and morally, beyond reach of another. This fact in an extended territory takes place to manifold effect; and by being ſkilfully improved, tends to multiply the riches and reſources of a country. Such advantages flow, in a conſiderable degree, even from intercourſe with foreign ſtates; but, in far greater proportion, and to happier effect, in the various and multiplied relations of different parts of the ſame country, whereby the peculiar induſtry, and products, and wants, of various

ous diſtricts, contribute reciprocally to the proſperity of each, and, in entire effect, to the enlarged proſperity of the whole ſtate. Hence, various and extenſive interchange of benefits neceſſarily begets correſponding intercourſe; real intereſt becomes better underſtood; prejudices ſubmit to experience; and amity and ſucceſs, going hand in hand, mutually promote each other. And hence may be inferred, the futility of all thoſe invidious ſtatements and calculations, which are manufactured by party diſputants, for the purpoſe of ſhewing the ſuperiour advantage of either kingdom in its intercourſe with the other. Theſe are not neceſſary to prove that the ſeparation of Ireland would ultimately ruin Great Britain, or that Ireland could not exiſt unconnected with Great Britain. All the garbling, miſnaming, and ſophiſtry, with which ſome of them have been introduced and diſplayed might eaſily have been ſpared.* Theſe Iſlands, it appears clearly enough without all this machinery, are formed by nature, by relation, by habit, by common hope and fear, to coaleſce and to become perfectly one, in political eſſence, form, and energy.

But it ſeems, the woollen, cotton, iron, and pottery manufacturies, are thoſe in which Britiſh capital is chiefly employed, thoſe for which Great Britain is peculiarly fitted, and in which her people eminently excel; therefore Ireland in all the enriching arts of induſtry, is to degenerate after Union, Britiſh capital will no longer contribute to ſupport her trade, and

* See ſhamefully ſophiſtical ſtatements detected in *obſervations on that part of the Speaker's ſpeech which relates to trade*, from page 16 to page 29.

Britiſh

Britiſh ſettlers will be more deterred than ever from making, or taking part in, eſtabliſhments among us. That Great Britain is unrivalled in thoſe manufactures is neither to be denied nor regretted; they contribute conſiderably to her riches, and to that might which ſhe is now putting forth in a common defence. But even in theſe arts of induſtry we have a ſhare; and ſo far as may be conſiſtent with the application of our capital, and with our attention to thoſe objects for which we are beſt fitted, and in which we have eminently proſpered, we may juſtly encourage the hope of taking, in progreſſion, a larger ſhare. That this country is capable of cultivating the woollen manufacture to conſiderable extent is undoubted, from the very inſtance, which the oppoſers of Union adduce, of the proſperous ſtate of that manufacture in Ireland at a very early period; and from the fact that, for a good while paſt, and at this moment a reſpectable trade has been and is carried on in the coarſer branches of woollen goods. It may be true that in 1698, Ireland exported woollens to the amount of above 100,000l. and in 1798, to the amount only of 12,000l. and yet in the latter period more woollen goods may have been manufactured in Ireland than in the former period; for, the prodigious increaſe of her people, and of their ability to purchaſe cloathing, within the laſt century, has been ſuch as to annihilate any inference which can be drawn from this difference of export. A ſimilar obſervation is applicable to the ſtatement that, about ten years ago Britain exported in woollen manufacture to the whole world 4,368,936l. in value, and in the laſt year, 6,836,603l. and that out of the former there went to Ireland 353,781l. and out of the

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latter 580,723l. ſo that in ten years the increaſe of export to Ireland was more than in an equal proportion to the increaſe of export to the reſt of the world*. It follows not hence, that a leſs quantity of woollen goods was manufactured in the year 1798 than in the year 1788, either in Ireland or in the reſt of the world; but it may follow, as the fact is, that in the progreſs of nations, Ireland, as well as the reſt of the world, but in greater proportion than in many parts of it, has, within the laſt ten years, increaſed in riches, and particularly in the numbers of thoſe deſcriptions of people, who have acquired the means of purchaſing the finer woollens which Britain ſupplies. In the coarſer woollens manufactured at home, we ſee the great body of our numerous population cloathed; and this is abundant proof, that whenever circumſtances ſhall make it our intereſt, to extend or vary this branch of induſtry, we have it fully in our power. But it is acknowledged that Ireland works up all the wool it has, and it is added that there is little reaſon to expect that the quantity will be enlarged, as the increaſe of the linen manufacture and of agriculture gives a greater profit in land than ſheep afford†. Is it not obvious therefore that Ireland is now in poſſeſſion of other means of proſperity, which it would be folly to ſacrifice to the premature and forced cultivation of certain branches of manufacture, which other parts of the ſame empire, (an empire every loyal man wiſhes to be one in intereſt) happen to cultivate with peculiar ſkill and to proſperous effect?

* Speaker's Speech, 72.
† Speaker's Speech, 72.

In the cotton manufacture alſo, particularly in the coarſer branches of it, which do not require ſuperiour ſkill, and which are beſt fitted for common conſumption, conſiderable advances have been made. The cotton manufacture eſtabliſhed and conducted with great ſpirit and on great capital by Meſſrs. Orr, (natives of Great Britain) affords a moſt reſpectable inſtance indeed of what may be done in this country, when the advanced ſtate of Ireland ſhall give an equally cheap raw material as Britain procures, and ſhall afford from more eſſential occupations a ſuperfluity of capital.

In the manufacture of Iron for the more general and uſeful purpoſes of life, ſome ſpirited efforts have been crowned with ſucceſs. Not to mention others, Mr. Blair's extenſive works on the River Liffey near Dublin, furniſh a ſtriking example of what may be effected. Even in what is called the pottery manufacture, this country has proved itſelf not incapable; and that it poſſeſſes all the requiſite natural advantages in a ſuperiour degree, has been fully ſhewn*. And till now it has not been denied, that capital, enterpriſe, and ſkill, are only wanting to raiſe Ireland by degrees, to the higheſt ſtate of proſperity in which cultivated arts can place a nation. No doubt, until long eſtabliſhment has given capital and ſkill, it may be neceſſary to encourage thoſe who have engaged in manufactures in which Great Britain has long excelled,

* See Obſervations on that part of the Speaker's Speech, which relates to Trade.—See alſo Mr. Wedgwood's Evidence before the Houſe of Commons in England, in May, 1785.

by

by fixing upon ſuch articles, duties which may preſerve to our own riſing fabricks the home conſumption, which home conſumption in a populous country is always ſufficient, in a reaſonable length of time, to eſtabliſh whatever employment the circumſtances of a people fit them to purſue. Such encouragement makes part of the plan of Union laid before his Majeſty. Whatever capital has been embarked, therefore, and whatever induſtry exerted, under exiſting laws, in any infant undertakings, have compleat effect ſecured, ſo far as may be conſiſtent with the collective good of the country. Under ſuch encouragement for a conſiderable time, (and in juſtice and good policy, ought to be for a for a conſiderable time) the capabilities of ſucceſs in various purſuits will have taken root, while thoſe in which we could but ſtruggle by the aid of a tax upon the conſumption of our people, will gradually yield to others in which capital may be more beneficially employed.

In one branch of manufacture we are confeſſedly unrivalled; and the increaſing demand from other countries, particularly from the great continent of America multiplying with people, opens to induſtry and capital a field for enterpriſe of indefinite extent. In agriculture, notwithſtanding the increaſed produce of corn, at the expence and under the operation of bounties, this country is in an incalculable proportion inferiour to Great Britain*; and yet, its very ſuperiour ſoil, and

* The contrary is indeed moſt ſtrangely inſinuated in the Speaker's Speech, page 106, where it is ſaid, that Ireland ſupplies largely that kingdom whoſe proſperity we are deſired to imitate, and who cannot maintain itſelf. It is ſurely an extraordinary inference that, becauſe a country

numerous people, render it peculiarly capable of ſurpaſſing almoſt every other country, in the bleſſings to be derived from this prime ſource of national wealth and happineſs. Look to Great Britain, and obſerve the quantity of capital employed in agriculture, the knowledge and ſpirit with which it is carried on, and the ſcene of induſtry, plenty, and comfort which it exhibits; while in Ireland, ſtarved for want of capital, and chiefly conducted by an ignorant and torpid claſs of men, this fine country has hitherto but conjectured what it is capable of, and inſtead of preſenting a race of flouriſhing occupiers of the land, the happieſt and moſt uſeful members of the community, has too generally expoſed a wretched aſpect of poverty and failure. To put this country in the ſame ſtate of agriculture as that at which Great Britain has arrived, would coſt, according to Mr. Arthur Young's calculation, little leſs than one hundred millions ſterling.

Now, whence can we expect an acceſſion of capital, knowledge, induſtry, and enterpriſe, but from that ſupereminently flouriſhing kingdom, with which we are partially connected, and with which a perfect Union

a country occaſionally imports corn, therefore it cannot maintain itſelf; for, if the ſame country happens to export in a greater proportion than it imports corn, it follows that it can more than maintain itſelf. Now, in the laſt edition of *Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations*, the enlightened and accurate author ſtates, that Great Britain imports only a quantity of grain equal to about the five hundred and ſeventieth part of its home conſumption, while it exports a quantity equal to about the thirtieth part of what it conſumes; that is, it exports more than eighteen times as much as it imports. And yet it ſeems Great Britain cannot maintain itſelf! A concluſion, if it were true, unhappy for Ireland as well as for Great Britain.

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muſt give to all ranks of its people, confidence, and, by progreſſive conſequences, all the cordiality of co-patriotiſm?

Already conſiderable ſums have from time to time been lent to this country by Great Britain upon landed ſecurity; and it is notorious that a very conſiderable part of the trade of Ireland is carried on by aid of Britiſh capital. Whatever we can produce which, in any part of the immenſely extended correſpondence of Great Britain, can ſupply demand, is taken with avidity from Ireland, paid for in advance, and tranſported to the ultimate ports of deſtination, to be widely diffuſed under encouragement of the indulgent credit given by Britiſh wealth. Of the prodigious quantity of our ſtaple manufacture, the linen, ſent yearly to Great Britain, above two thirds of the value are paid in advance by the merchants to whom it is conſigned; and ſome Britiſh capital has even been veſted in eſtabliſhments of that manufacture in Ireland. In fact, ſo connected and interwoven is the proſperity of this country with the proſperity of Great Britain, that almoſt exactly in the proportion that Britiſh commerce has extended, the demands for what Ireland can ſupply have increaſed, and the aſſiſtance of Britiſh capital to call forth that ſupply has been extended. So ſenſible of theſe truths are many of the northern linen manufacturers, and many leading commercial men in Cork and other convenient ſea ports, that no efforts of party violence or affected patriotiſm, have been able to prevent them from ſeeing and acknowledging, the acceſſion of benefit to be derived, from more intimate connexion with Great Britain.

In that highly improved country, every active purſuit has been carried to ſuch extent, that enormous capital and animated enterprize ſeek new fields of action. Before the political convulſion of France, eſtabliſhments in that country were meditated, and ſome actually commenced by enterpriſing Engliſhmen. Even in this tremendous war, ſo has the courſe of events concurred with the ability and ſpirit of Britain, that her wealth and her enriching ſources have increaſed beyond all former experience or hope. Conſider then the circumſtances of Ireland. Our climate as good and our ſoil ſuperiour; the means of ſubſiſtence more eaſily raiſed than in almoſt any other country; a hardy and numerous people capable of furniſhing, at moderate rate, a prodigious quantity of uſeful labour, to all the arts of life; and a coaſt ſuperabundantly ſupplied with commodious havens for all the purpoſes of ready export and import. Think alſo of the ſituation of Great Britain. The national principal ſtock ſwelled to enormous amount, by the acceſſion of emigrated property, and by the profits of enlarged commerce; the ſum of wealth employed in war returning, on the eſtabliſhment of peace, into the boſom of an already incalculable capital; and her people active and experienced in every induſtrious and enriching occupation, acute to diſcern where and how advantages are to be purſued, and bent upon enterpriſe beyond all other nations. Thus circumſtanced theſe kingdoms become perfectly united, whereby all ſeparate intereſt is annihilated, diſtinct nationality is loſt in the entireneſs of the one conſolidated ſtate, the ſame ſupreme authority flowing from the whole preſides over and regulates the whole of both countries, and the ſame laws equally controul, encourage,

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and ſecure, all the inhabitants of the united kingdom. What muſt naturally follow? No longer conſidered as a diſtinct or hoſtile country, but as a diſtrict of their own country, and bleſſed with ſuperiour advantages, enterpriſing Engliſhmen, not yet fixed in permanent eſtabliſhments, with a ſuperfluity of capital open to their uſe, muſt occaſionally gratify the ſpirit of adventure in a comparatively new and unoccupied field. Frequent ſucceſs cannot but operate to encourage new undertakings; and our various advantages, whatever they are, muſt conſequently become better underſtood and more ſucceſsfully purſued, whether in agriculture, in long eſtabliſhed manufacture, or in riſing or in new undertakings. It is ſtrange to ſay, that all this muſt fail becauſe we have not the cheap fuel with which Great Britain, raiſing it within herſelf, is furniſhed; and at the ſame moment to inform us, that if urged to it we can raiſe abundance in our own country. No doubt we can, and it will naturally make a uſeful part of our progreſs, to raiſe that valuable article in abundance, and to ſupply it at cheap price to all the arts in which it is employed. In the meantime, the difference of the price of fuel makes ſo ſmall a part of the coſt of moſt manufactures, compared with that of many other materials employed, but particularly with the coſt of labour, and is ſo fully compenſated by the preſent duties, which are to remain for a conſiderable though limited time, and afterwards to be continued or gradually diminiſhed as publick good may require, that no real diſcouragement takes place or can rationally operate.* The circuitous means by which ſo

* It is material to obſerve, that the flouriſhing ſtate of manufactures, depends not ſo much upon the rate of profit as upon the extenſion

ſo many of the raw materials are obtained by this country, enhanced in price by additional profit, freight, inſurance, and other expences, contributes more perhaps than any other circumſtance, to retard thoſe manufactures in which we have not eminently excelled; and the low ſtate of induſtry among our people, which prevents the extenſion of home conſumption adds to the diſcouragement. The ſmallneſs of capital employed in foreign trade and in agriculture is the cauſe of both theſe deficiencies. Let men poſſeſſed of property, or capable obtaining the enlarged uſe of it, in the ſiſter kingdom, and ardent for active employment, ſee this happily circumſtanced country, no longer governed through the medium of an intereſted and doubtful oligarchy, no longer liable to be regulated by laws diſtinct from their own, no longer influenced by ſeparate or incompatible intereſts, and no longer, by the very nature of a diſtinct ſtate, and in the daily proceedings of its ſeparate legiſlature, cheriſhing and bringing into action invidious and alienating principles, but in every particular of intereſt government and regulation the ſame; then, apprehenſion and diſcouragement removed, all our natural advan-

tenſion of ſale, which extenſion of ſale is beſt promoted by ſkill and capital. A manufacture making only ten per cent. on the capital employed may be far more flouriſhing than one making fifteen per cent. on account of the far greater quantity of buſineſs done by the former than the latter. In ſeveral manufactures in Ireland, at this moment, the rate of profit is greater than in thoſe of the ſame kind in Great Britain; but the greater capital employed, and the greater extent of ſale, make thoſe in Great Britain generally more flouriſhing and productive. Under the encouragement of duties, fixed for a limited but conſiderable time, and afterwards to be gradually diminiſhed, Ireland will have full opportunity, to improve her ſkill, increaſe her capital, and extend her ſale, ſo as with a leſs rate of profit, to flouriſh more eminently in all the arts, for the enlarged cultivation of which nature may have endowed her.

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tages are left at liberty to operate, with full force of motive, upon every active energy to be found in any part of the united whole. We may therefore confidently expect that the skill in every branch of agriculture, now arrived at such a height in Great Britain, and still cultivated with a degree of ardour pregnant with future blessings, will, with the assistance of overflowing capital, reach the rich and extensive tracts in Ireland, which may be obtained upon terms far inferiour to those on which the naturally inferiour lands of Britain are farmed; and that the commodious ports of our finely indented coast, will from time to time invite many to make establishments or take part in establishments, for the purpose of supplying foreign nations with our productions, and of importing the various articles useful at home or fit to be easily distributed to other countries.

Should such instances be at first but few, should they multiply but by slow degrees, yet still the effects would be happy. Men of condition and property in this country would occasionally imitate the example, and in their own exertions, or in directing the attention of their sons to useful employment, would promote individual and collective interest. Hence, motives to industry would be multiplied; hence, skill and enterprise would follow; hence, our people would be more generally employed and consequently ameliorated; and hence, in the enjoyment of the fruits of industry, a taste for the comforts of civilized life would be created, and every active pursuit invigorated.

To a foreign state the superflux of capital is not easily trusted; in a foreign state the apprehensive stranger is

not confident of protection: therefore the advantages of a foreign ſtate are neither ſought nor cultivated. But in the ſame ſtate, where ſecurity of property and protection of the individual are maintained and guarded by the ſame univerſally pervading authority, the ſubject is confident in every part of the common territory, and conſequently the numbers are greatly increaſed of thoſe who, ſtimulated by the deſire of acquiſition, ſearch for the means of improving their fortunes, and in the ſearch, multiply the probabilities of diſcovering the natural, and improving the cultivated ſources, of individual gain and national proſperity. Ireland has been in material, reſpects as a foreign ſtate. The ſupreme, authority which regulates all its important concerns is different; the debates in the legiſlature are conſtantly grounded on an oppoſition of intereſts; and jealouſy and rivalry maintain and extend an unfortunate religious and national antipathy. But the two kingdoms, on the plan of Union, are no longer to be foreign in any reſpect; the oppoſition of intereſts can only be that of the united ſtate and of foreign or hoſtile nations; jealouſy and rivalry being removed, and the one ſuperiour legiſlature directing its attention to the healing of differences, Union of ſentiment and affection will conſequently by degrees follow Union of politial conſtitution. Hence with confidence we infer, that eaſy and free communication among all the ſubjects of the common ſtate, and more enlarged and various interchange of benefits, will greatly increaſe the proſperity and happineſs of the whole.

The plan of the œconomiſts of France for eſtabliſhing a free, umburthened and uncontrouled intercourſe of nations in the interchange of their peculiar benefits,

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and mutual ſupply of their peculiar wants, will then (ſo far as regards theſe iſlands) be no longer viſionary.

The very circumſtance of being divided by a narrow ſea, inſtead of furniſhing a reaſon for ſuppoſing that Providence intended they ſhould ever remain ſeparate ſtates, points out the ſuperiour utility of their political Union. It enlarges the extent of common coaſts; it tends to increaſe their common commerce, and to augment their common wealth; it contributes to multiply that bold and hardy race of men, upon whoſe ſkill, activity, and gallantry, depend the ſafety, dignity, and proſperity, of this maritime empire, formed to be the great defence of human rights; it aſſiſts to ſpread wider our ſhipping through the world, to extend our influence, and to add to our reſources; and, in varying the peculiarities of human character, which various ſituation occaſions, brings more varied occupation and purſuit to operate, to the great common and valuable purpoſe, the publick good.

Neither need Great Britain be at all apprehenſive of any loſs to her by the gain of united Ireland. The world is ſufficiently wide for both. Beſides, it has long been diſcovered, that induſtrious nations thrive not by the poverty and loſs of their neighbours, but by their wealth and proſperity; for ſo has nature diverſified this earth and its inhabitants, that the poſſeſſions as well as wants of different countries contribute to common benefit. Were Great Britain and Ireland, acting upon the principle of diſtinct and therefore frequently inconſiſtent intereſt, to counteract each other by hoſtile commercial laws, they might eaſily drive to foreign coun-

tries, the advantages which each is peculiarly fitted to purſue; whereas, by compleat conſolidation, by acting under the ſame regulations, more various arts may be preſerved and cultivated in the common territory, more various claſſes of uſeful ſubjects may be employed, and the more effectually and happily may the purſuits and productions of each country, and of every diſtrict of each country, be extended to their full capability.

In ſuch a ſcene of things, it is not improbable indeed, that the comparative conſequence and power of the ariſtocracy of Ireland might become ſomewhat abated. They would no longer rule this country in the form of a ſmall faction, commanding the greater and diſtributing the leſſer favours of the ſtate; but, mingled with the other great intereſts of the empire, would learn to underſtand and to reſpect the nature of a uſeful gradation of ranks: and, inſtead of forming an anomalous and diſtracting imperium in imperio, would fill their proper and important place in the ſcale of government. Hitherto a deſtructive chaſm in ſociety has long ſubſiſted between the higher and lower orders of the community; in conſequence of which, ſympathy and intercourſe having been excluded, the prejudices and bad ſentiments, which the natural ſituation of each foſters in minds not corrected by neceſſity or diſcipline, have had full ſcope to operate, and have not only prevented mutual cordiality and uſefulneſs, but have promoted fraud and lawleſsneſs on the one ſide, and inſolence and oppreſſion on the other. But, in a ſtate of ſociety growing daily more ſimilar to that of Great Britain, in which every order takes its juſt ſituation in the great ſyſtem of ſubordination, and in which rank approaches and blends

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into rank, mutually ſupporting and ſupported, ſelf intereſt, neceſſity, opinion, every powerful principle, bind together the community, form a chain of good offices, and at once ſecure the tranquillity and improve the character of the nation. We ſhould then hear not long of an overbearing ariſtocracy or gentry, too many of whom (certainly not all, for we have happy exceptions) have taken little intereſt in the condition or fate of their inferiours and dependents; but, in the progreſſive improvement of ſociety, we ſhould ſee an ariſtocracy, the chief in example as the chief in rank, as eminently the ſtewards as the favourites of Providence, who, conſidering their own intereſts as interwoven with the intereſts of the loweſt in the community, would regard with ſcrupulous obſervance the fair claims between man and man, would ſubdue inveterate prejudice by manly intercourſe, and, in a career of enlightened beneficence, enlarge the general happineſs;—characters, allied to thoſe whom after ages venerate,

Quique ſui memores alios fecere merendo.

The complete conſolidation of theſe kingdoms, however, chiefly impreſſes the mind of every friend to Great Britain and Ireland, in its powerful tendency to give to the Britiſh Empire ſtrength and ſtability; in which is neceſſarily involved the ſecurity of our liberties, our laws, and our religion.

In any other caſe than the preſent, in which prejudice, pride, and party ſpirit take ſuch a lead, one ſhould ſuppoſe, that the mere ſtatement of the ſituation of theſe kingdoms, would ſatisfy every man who

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has at all conſidered human affairs, that the nature of our connexion tends to diſunion and weakneſs, and that in compleat Union only, can rational hope be found of permanent ſtability.

It is not pretended that the beſt concerted Union, though it might immediately add force to the exertions of the Empire, and impreſs enemies and traitors with awe, would operate as by magical power, and inſtantly compoſe the violence, eradicate the ſecretly working miſchief, and change the character of this country. No—We are well aware that we muſt now brave the fury of the ſtorm: and, under the auſpicious lead of Great Britain, we hope and look for, a favourable iſſue to the conteſt, in which we are engaged with jacobin France and the jacobins of Ireland. But the fiery trial through which we are paſſing, may well make us dread, and prepare againſt, the conſequences of ſuch a future day.

The return of peace will remove the imminent danger which unites the loyal and makes them vigilant. It will alſo remove the extraordinary reſtraints which neceſſity has impoſed, but which, however neceſſary in the preſent conflict for exiſtence, make part of the evils of a war impoſed upon us, and would be incompatible with eſtabliſhed peace, from which we hope for the advancement of national proſperity and power, in all the freedom of exertion congenial to our happy conſtitution. But we cannot expect that, notwithſtanding peace, reſtleſs and ambitious France would ceaſe to forward her ſchemes againſt the Britiſh power; neither are we to expect that, in a period of peace, the diſaffected at

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home would not buſily employ themſelves, in preparing, under ſpecious pretexts, thoſe various political meaſures, which operate by ſure though perhaps moderate gradations, to the ſubverſion of eſtabliſhed government.

In the meantime, the prejudices and jealouſies that ſubſiſt between theſe kingdoms, the prodigious ſpread of democratick principles in this country, the diſtinctneſs of the two ſupreme authorities, the growth of the national ſpirit of independence, and the increaſe of popular influence, preſent to the intriguing ſpirit of France, moſt prolifick ſources of diſorder: and, ſhould new conflicts with the ſame depraved and deſtroying power hereafter become neceſſary, it appears morally certain that, in ſome of them, diſtraction of counſel and diſunion of operation, would ſupply what might be wanting to realize the ſchemes of the enemy.

Now, on reviewing the evils produced by the nature of our connexion, which in former times diſtracted and afflicted this country, and on conſidering the dangers which, under all the circumſtances of our ſituation, are connected with and muſt neceſſarily flow from ſeparate and independent legiſlatures, what proſpect of permanent ſtability remains but in a legiſlative Union, which ſhall conſolidate our intereſts, authorities and powers? If the wealth, power, and loyalty of the Empire be divided, a facility is preſented of being wrought upon by vicious influence, or awed by the menaces of force: but a united legiſlature would give to the incorporated kingdoms a grand and reſiſtleſs phalanx, of the rank, property, abilities, and fidelity

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of both countries; no part of which could any longer be employed in ſetting in oppoſition the intereſts and prejudices of their reſpective diſtinct ſtates; but, undivided in national ſentiment and national objects, muſt, in its eſſential nature, ſupply powerful reſiſtance to whatever dangerous influence might prevail in any part of either country. In the preſent convulſed ſtate of the political world, diſtraction of views or of action muſt prove more fatal to a ſtate in which they take place, than in any former time: but, in a united legiſlature, we ſhould derive ſecurity, from Union of mind and Union of operation, in the purſuit of every national object, whether of peace or of war. In peace, the dangerous movements of ſurrounding nations would be attended to with the united vigilance of all the great and loyal intereſts of the Empire, and counteracted, in promptitude of preparation, by the one directing ſpirit and authority of the whole ſtate: And if actual war become neceſſary, we ſhould dread no diſunion of deciſion in the two diſtinct, powerful, and independent authorities, but, in the immediate exerciſe of one legiſlative will, regulating the reſources, and ultimately directing the power of the Empire, we ſhould find the ſureſt confidence of defeating the deſigns of our enemies.

The United States of America were ſo ſenſible of the danger likely to flow from diſtraction of counſel in diſtinct and co-equal legiſlatures, in matters of national concern, that, when in the year 1787, they changed their confederation into more intimate Union, powers were given to the Congreſs, that is, to an imperial and common legiſlature, to the following effect,—"To

"lay

"lay and collect taxes, duties, impoſts, and exci-
"ſes, to pay the debts and provide for the com-
"mon defence and general welfare of the United
"States—to borrow money on the credit of the Unit-
"ed States—to raiſe and ſupport armies—to provide
"and maintain a navy—to make rules for the govern-
"ment and regulation of the land and naval forces—
"to provide for calling forth the militia, to execute
"the laws of the Union, ſuppreſs inſurrections, and re-
"pel invaſions—to provide for organizing, arming and
"diſciplining the militia—to make all laws which ſhall
"be neceſſary and proper for carrying into execution
"the foregoing powers." Here are the moſt impor-
tant of legiſlative powers, which the United States have
judged it neceſſary to commit to a common legiſlature,
but which are reſpectively and diſtinctly veſted in, and
reſpectively and diſtinctly exerciſed by, the ſeparate
legiſlatures of Great Britain and Ireland: and yet, the
United States are divided by an ocean of three thou-
ſand miles extent, from all the ſtates that can materi-
ally affect them; and, the number, complication, and
importance, of their political relations, as well as the
magnitude of their exertions, are of no conſideration,
compared with thoſe of the Britiſh Empire. From ſo
early an opinion of the neceſſity of cloſer Union, and
from the inſtances we lately witneſſed of particular
ſtates, in a time of danger, entering into reſolutions
repugnant to the determinations of Congreſs, the ſtrong
probability follows that, when the United States be-
come more powerful, when the effects of national con-
duct become more numerous and important, and when,
in the progreſs of ſociety among them, men of leiſure
and active ſpirit, form parties, and create political diſ-
cord, the good ſenſe of that people will lead them to

incorporate in ſtill cloſer Union, in order the more effectually to ſecure the commonwealth, againſt the deſtructive conſequences of internal convulſion and foreign violence. But, in our greater and more important ſituation, all the conſiderations that have induced or can induce the United States, to conſolidate their powers, weigh with ten-fold force, and ſeem to point to Union, as the great fortreſs, which nature and reaſon have provided, for the permanent ſecurity of theſe iſlands.

In a united legiſlature alſo, where local prejudices or influence could not prevail, whatever grievances might occaſionally claim conſideration, would meet with moſt equitable diſcuſſion and moſt ſecure redreſs; while complaints or claims, generated by party ſpirit or party deſigns, whether political or religious, would meet with that determined reſiſtance, which muſt naturally inſpire the collective repreſentation of nearly all the loyalty to the Conſtitution, and all the attachment to the Proteſtant cauſe, to be foundin the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

In this point of view, the ſituation and claims of the Roman catholicks are neceſſarily preſented to the mind.

The whole train of events in the hiſtory of Ireland, joined to our own experience, perfectly aſſure us, that the great body of that ſect cannot be entruſted with political power, in our preſent diſtinct ſtate, conſiſtently with the ſecurity of our religion, and by conſequence, of our civil eſtabliſhment. Moſt of the relaxations and

conceſſions

conceſſions that have been made in their favour, ſeem to have been dictated by a benign ſpirit and an enlightened policy; but the elective franchiſe, which neceſſarily confers ſo large a portion of political power, cannot but be conſidered as a moſt dangerous grant, to an immenſe body, the greater part of which, unhappily, are inimical to our religion and our connexion with Great Britain. Their growing importance, their active zeal, and their ſpirit of combination, directed in a ſteady and ſyſtematick courſe of action, to the objects they have conſtantly held in view, muſt, by the aid of this political engine, unleſs fruſtrated by an acceſſion of reſiſtance, procure to them, in proceſs of time, ſuch pervading influence through the nation, as neceſſarily to enſure powerful influence in the legiſlature, and the final accompliſhment of their purpoſes. But whether, under all circumſtances, the ſtep at the time it was made, was juſtifiable or not, yet, in having made it, we may be ſaid to have paſſed the Rubicon; and we cannot recede, without expoſing the country to ſuch critical danger, and devoting it to ſuch actual calamity, as revolt every liberal mind.

In whatever light therefore, this important body of people are conſidered, the government of the country muſt be embaraſſed, and the publick ſafety endangered. But in a united legiſlature, all embarraſſment and danger are done away, in a matter of ſuch eſſential influence on our peace and ſafety. We ſhould then become incorporated with a people more powerful and numerous than ourſelves, almoſt entirely proteſtant, attached to their religion, and anxious for its preſervation; the legiſlature emanating from that country muſt

always remain proteſtant, and ſubject to proteſtant influence; no conſequences therefore could follow dangerous to the eſtabliſhed religion of Ireland, whether the comparative influence of Roman catholicks in this country remains as it is, or ſhould in progreſs of time extend its power.

It is equally abſurd as dangerous to act upon the inconſiſtent principle, of maintaining our conſtitution, excluſively of the ſecurity of our eſtabliſhed religion. What do we mean by our conſtitution? We mean that ſyſtem of regulations, rights, and privileges, which, weak and imperfect at infancy, has grown with the growth, ſtrengthened with the ſtrength, and become grand and compleat with the improvement, of Great Britain. With the reformation, the human mind in Britain greatly advanced; and the beauty, order, and fixed principles, of civil ſociety, became daily more intimately blended with the proteſtant ſyſtem of religion. The genius, the manners, the cuſtoms, and the laws of this proteſtant Empire, have flowed, and ſtill flow, from this mingled ſource; and to ſeparate or weaken the auſpicious Union of religion and law, would be to ſubvert our conſtitution, ſhake our ſtability, and endanger our exiſtence. But, whatever hope we may have entertained, whatever efforts of liberality we may have made, it is now out of controverſy, that the ultimate deſign of the great majority of Roman catholicks in this country, inſtigated by too many of their inferiour clergy, has been, by the aid of civil privilege, and under foreign auſpices, to overturn our religious eſtabliſhment, and to acquire, at the expence of whatever convulſion, the triumphant aſcendent to

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their own. At the ſame time, we are fully convinced, that the extenſion of civil privilege tends to enlarge the publick mind, and to give motives to all thoſe uſeful energies, which make the power and proſperity of a nation.

The Roman catholick accordingly, enjoys all the religious toleration that under a proteſtant conſtitution can be conceived; he is furniſhed in his perfectly equal dominion over his property, with every motive to uſeful exertion that can inſpire the proteſtant. And nothing remains withheld but the capacity of gratifying an ambition, perhaps not a wiſe one, of poſſeſſing place, and rule, and authority in the ſtate.

In order therefore, to preſerve toleration of religion with eſtabliſhment of religion, civil privilege with civil ſecurity, we ſeek to ſtrengthen and to render inviolable, the comparatively weak ſtate of the proteſtant cauſe in this country, by an incorporation of proteſtant power and authority, with that great country, the nature and character of whoſe people through all their ranks is proteſtant, and whoſe laws and liberties are ſo cemented with their religion, that they muſt ceaſe to be anation, before their religious eſtabliſhment be overthrown.

Then would all hope be cut up by the roots, of ſapping the foundations of our religious eſtabliſhment, and of perverting our conſtitution, in order to give to this country a Roman catholick eſtabliſhment; and in the deſtruction of that hope, the Roman catholick would attend to, cheriſh, and improve, the ſubſtantial bleſſings he actually poſſeſſes; in conſequence of which, both publick and private enemies of our conſtitutional

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happineſs muſt loſe motive and encouragement; and we ſhould preſent to the world, a powerful, free, and happy, proteſtant kingdom ~~and~~ empire, in which, about one ſixth of the people of a different and even repugnant religon, would be ſeen to enjoy ſuch bleſſings under a mild and benignant ſway, that abſurdity and bigotry would moſt probably, from day to day, yield to the light of reaſon, and take part with eſtabliſhment, conſtitution, and loyalty.

And in truth, even at the preſent moment, we rejoice in knowing that ſociety is qualified and bleſſed with many, very many liberal, enlightened, and benignant Roman catholicks: and we earneſtly hope that their numbers may increaſe, as well as their influence over a multitude, whoſe exceſſes they lament, and whom they pity as the infatuated inſtruments of vicious conſpirators. Of ſuch Roman catholicks we entertain no dread; we conſider them not only as our fellow ſubjects, but as our friends and fellow chriſtians. We are aware that they regard the Britiſh conſtitution as a ſyſtem which has grown out of experience, which has been improved by wiſdom operating upon experience, and which has proved in practice, at leaſt among the people who have fully enjoyed it, the beſt calculated to preſerve to the eccentrick nature of man, ſocial order, liberty, and happineſs. We know that fellow chriſtians of this deſcription, recogniſing religion as a Divine gift to man, to make him good and happy, could be very little inclined indeed, to aid the overthrow of a religious eſtabliſhment, which, though not exactly agreeable to their opinions, yet obviouſly contributes, in a conſiderable degree, to preſerve among

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all rank, the ſacred obligations of morality; and the deſtruction of which would be ultimately followed, (if we can judge from what has actually taken place in other countries) by the moſt dreadful monſter that ever devoured a people's bleſſings,—cold, unfeeling, malignant irreligion.

If then, in the event of a Union, it ſhould be deemed expedient (as ſeems now probable, indeed almoſt morally certain) to take into conſideration, at a fit ſeaſon, in the united legiſlature, the utility of doing away all that remains of invidious diſtinction, between the Proteſtant and the Roman Catholick of Ireland, we may expect the moſt benign effects. The privilege of ſitting in the legiſlature of theſe realms, would, by the very nature of man, enſure to us, in the leading families of the Roman Catholick body, new and invigorated motives, to the cultivation of every valuable quality that makes the loyal and uſeful ſubject: the conſtant intercourſe of reſpectable Roman Catholicks with their co-repreſentatives from Ireland, and with the members at large of the firſt aſſembly that ever graced the world, muſt gradually deſtroy every unworthy prejudice; and conſequently, they would return to their conſtituents with ſuch diſpoſitions and views, as could not fail to diffuſe through the whole body, the happieſt influence. All ſubject and all occaſion for jealouſy and offence being for ever removed, we might confidently hope, that under the impartial conduct of the common legiſlature, the inhabitants of this country would, ere long, ceaſe to embarraſs and weaken, by diſcord and diſunion, the exertions of the empire, but that, in a courſe of cordiality and proſperity, they would grow in attachment to the

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common cauſe, and powerfully contribute to the common ſecurity.

In legiſlative Union alſo, it is material to add, the abounding demagogues of this country, loſe every hope of creating an influence which ſhould overawe the legiſlature. Their invidious pretexts reſpecting a depreſſed religion of the great majority of the ſtate, a ſeparate intereſt, and national independence, could no longer find diſtinct ſubject for operation: they would not then employ the parties in a diſtinct parliament as engines to promote their covered ſchemes; but if they ſhould continue their malignant efforts to diſtract ſociety, they muſt ſtand forth in their proper character, and in their native deformity, in defiance of the united legiſlature, and of the united and prompt force of the whole and every part, of conſolidated Britain and Ireland. Political adventure, at one time acting under the form of a bravoe for the ruling powers, and at another under that of the high minded patriot, but, in every ſhape, the bane of tranquillity and uſefulneſs, then deprived of motive, muſt relinquiſh its unprincipled and factious purſuit; and we ſhould ſee in the paths of buſineſs, literature, and ſcience, in the purſuit of objects uſeful to their country and to themſelves, thoſe vain, reſtleſs, or ardent characters, who, without originally vicious deſigns, have been too long carrying into effect, the views of a jacobin conſpiracy.

If improvements in our conſtitution, or regulations in relief or encouragement of the ſubject, ſhould be found neceſſary, the united legiſlature, compoſed of the loyalty, zeal, wiſdom, and firmneſs, of both countries, unaffected

unaffected by any dangerous influence, would naturally, and in the courſe of occurring circumſtances and events, as the Britiſh legiſlature has long done, adopt ſuch wholeſome meaſures, as might beſt ſerve the well weighed intereſt and happineſs of the united kingdoms.

And in fine, in the one legiſlature of the undivided and inſeparable ſtate, every motive of patriotiſm and honourable pride, would have full, ſafe, and uſeful ſcope of action; and, in all thoſe enlightened exertions, of which the admired example of Britain gives a ſure promiſe, to multiply and expand the reſources, and to enlarge the proſperity and power of the empire, the hearts of the loyal in both countries, would be animated and ſupported, under every effort for private or publick benefit, by the confident hope of permanent ſecurity.

The circumſtances which led to the Union of Scotland, and the effects which have flowed from it, fully corroborate every reaſon offered for a Union of Ireland. Scotland had ſubſiſted long as a ſeparate and independent ſtate, engaged in all the rivalry and conflict with England incident to their contiguous ſituation. The two nations had harraſſed and diſtracted each other for ages, to the detriment of both, but particularly of Scotland, which, except in the gallantry of her turbulent nobility, and the bravery of her poor and ſcattered people, exhibited no marks of national proſperity. The calamities reſulting from their ſituation, had been often lamented by the wiſer men of rank and authority in both kingdoms, and plans had been frequently concerted by which they might become united. Theſe all failed; but at length, the accidental Union of the two

crowns in the ſame perſon, ſeemed to promiſe a Union of laws, privileges, and intereſts, which ſhould deſtroy all former animoſity, and eſtabliſh the tranquillity and domeſtick happineſs of the whole iſland for ever. To effect ſo excellent a purpoſe, an incorporated Union was earneſtly ſought, and in the parliament of England even propoſed, in the reign of James the firſt; but national prejudices fruſtrated the conciliating and wholeſome plan. The two kingdoms therefore, until then perfectly ſeparate and independent, were to travel on together, connected ſimply by the identity of perſon in whom the crowns were veſted. That compleat independence ſhould be preſerved in a connexion of this nature, was impoſſible; and accordingly Mr. Hume ſays, it might eaſily have been foreſeen, that the independence of Scotland would be loſt, and that, if both ſtates perſevered in maintaining ſeparate laws and parliaments, the weaker muſt ſenſibly ſuffer ſubjection. The conſequences were exactly ſuch as might have been foreſeen. The intereſts of the two countries being diſtinct, and antient prejudice continuing to operate, the influence of the ſuperiour country was employed in depreſſing a dangerous rival rather than in elevating an inſeparable friend; and except on occaſions when England was involved in difficulties and diſaſters, we find that the influence of the ſuperiour country prevailed. In a ſtate of political Union ſo ſlight and defective, England was naturally led to watch with a jealous eye, and to guard againſt an increaſe of power in Scotland, which might be employed in ſchemes, dangerous to the conſtitution of the more proſperous kingdom. The part which the Scotch had acted during the civil war in England, furniſhed an inſtructive proof, of the effects to be dreaded

from

from the interference of Scotland in times of publick commotion; and accordingly, it is to be remarked, that after the reſtoration, means were uſed to reſtrain the trade, to prevent the reſources, and to depreſs the power of Scotiand. This ſyſtem continued during the reign of Charles the ſecond and of James the ſecond. In the reign of William, however, advances were made in the Scotch parliament, by political leaders ſupported by powerful parties, which not only aimed at and aſſerted the compleat independence of Scotland, but tended to endanger and even totally deſtroy the connexion with England. For, when the convention of eſtates in Scotland conferred the crown of that kingdom upon William, he received it attended with conditions, which tended to ſtrengthen their authority, and to weaken conſiderably that of the crown. Theſe were taken full advantage of, as well as the peculiar diſpoſition and ſituation of the king, who, having accompliſhed a revolution in the cauſe of liberty, and being ſurrounded with danger from the partiſans of the abdicated monarch, was not prepared to reſiſt the plauſible but dangerous claims of national enthuſiaſm and party ſpirit. Some of theſe demands were at firſt ſo palpably dangerous (among others, that of the right in parliament to appoint the judges) that they were evaded for a time. But new difficulties aroſe, dangers accumulated, and it was found that a conſiderable degree of conceſſion was neceſſary to enſure the peace and ſtability of government in Scotland. Among other conceſſions, the king's ſupremacy in matters of religion was ſurrendered, whereby the Preſbyterians became eſtabliſhed in the fullneſs of their claims; and the inſtitution of *the lords of articles* was completely aboliſhed. Theſe conceſſions compoſed

the nation for a ſhort time, but ſoon opened new ſources of diſorder. The Preſbyterians inflamed by the recollection of their ſufferings and by the furious zeal of their intolerant teachers, now became in their turn perſecutors of all who adhered to Epiſcopacy. Theſe latter, though by no means ſo numerous, yet being compoſed of conſiderably more of the nobility and higher gentry, and of the whole of the old tory party, were nearly as powerful; but the former having accompliſhed the revolution in Scotland and conferred the crown on William, gained an aſcendency which they were little fitted to uſe with moderation; and conſequently the nation became torn by all the violence of party. The preparations of France in favour of James, and the machinations of his numerous partiſans, rendered the authority of William precarious; and finding it impoſſible to gain both parties, he was forced to yield too far to the prejudices of the ruling party, who, peeviſh, headſtrong, ſelf-ſufficient, and always ready to take advantage of the king's ſituation, urged him occaſionally to ſanction meaſures which inflamed the publick diſorders. Meantime, the abolition of the *lords of articles* had given full ſcope to the influence and zeal of active leaders in the parliament, who, ſtep by ſtep, ſo far inflamed the nation, and excited the parliament in purſuit of popular meaſures favourable to diſtinctneſs and independence, that the power of the crown became weakened to inefficiency, and a ſpirit was created and foſtered, which haſtened to diſſolve the connexion between the two kingdoms. The inſtitution of *the lords of articles*, as it was modified in the reign of James the firſt of England, as it was revived after the reſtoration (having been aboliſhed in the troubleſome reign of Charles the firſt) and as it

continued

continued till the reign of William, conſiſted of eight biſhops choſen by the temporal lords, eight temporal lords choſen by the biſhops, ſixteen knights and burgeſſes choſen by the elected biſhops and temporal lords, and eight officers of ſtate appointed by the crown. Without the previous conſent of this body, the formation of which reſted ultimately in the power of the crown, no motion could be made in parliament. It is evident therefore, that ſo long as this inſtitution remained in force, the dependence of the legiſlature was perfectly ſecured; and Scotland could be conſidered as only a dependent province, with a ſubordinate legiſlature acting under the controul of the cabinet of England; in like manner as Ireland and the parliament of Ireland were to be conſidered, while the law of Poynings continued to operate. But the ſame ſpirit which ſeized the opportunity of aboliſhing the *lords of articles*, ſoon abuſed the liberty that had been acquired; and the king was actually forced to concur in acts of the Scotch parliament, which alarmed the parliament of England, and which brought on inquiries and conteſts nearly fatal to both kingdoms. The repugnant intereſts and mutually invidious ſentiments of the two nations and parliaments, continued to embarraſs and endanger the reign of William during his whole life; and that ſagacious prince, foreſeeing the deſtruction which in time muſt have neceſſarily followed from the unnatural and precarious ſituation of the two kingdoms, earneſtly recommended, in one of the laſt acts of his life, an incorporating Union, as eſſential to the ſafety and happineſs of both.

In the ſucceeding reign, the violence of parliamentary leaders, the contentions of diſcordant parties in the nation,

nation, and the enthuſiaſm in favour of diſtinct national authority and independence, ſoon precipitated the diſagreements between the two kingdoms to a compleat criſis. Any concurrence in, or ſanction of, the regulation of the ſucceſſion to the crown, which had been eſtabliſhed by the parliament of England, was obſtinately refuſed, until ſuch meaſures ſhould be carried, as tended not only to the ſeparation of the kingdoms, but to the ſubverſion of all regular or ſtable government. It was demanded that an act or acts ſhould be paſſed to the following effect;—that it ſhould be high treaſon to adminiſter the coronation oath, but by the appointment of the eſtates, or to own any perſon as king or queen until they ſhould accept ſuch terms as ſhould be ſettled in parliament: that elections ſhould be made every Michaelmas for a new parliament every year, to ſit the firſt of November next following, and adjourn themſelves from time to time until next Michaelmas: that the king ſhould give the royal aſſent to all laws offered by the eſtates: that a committee choſen by parliament out of their own members, ſhould under the king have the adminiſtration of the government, be his council, and accountable to the parliament, with power on extraordinary occaſions to call the parliament together; that the king without conſent of parliament ſhould not have the power of making peace and war, or that of concluding any treaty with any other ſtate or potentate: that all places and offices both civil and military formerly conferred by the crown, ſhould ever after be given by parliament: that no regiment or company of horſe, foot, or dragoons ſhould be kept on foot in peace or war, but by conſent of parliament: that no pardon for any tranſgreſſion ſhould

be

be valid without conſent of parliament: and that if any king ſhould break in upon theſe conditions of government, he ſhould by the eſtates be declared to have forfeited the crown. In the midſt of this political ferment in Scotland, England was engaged in war with France; the jacobite party concerted with the foreign enemy the means of overthrowing the government, and thoſe who, under the name of patriots, urged popular meaſures to the verge of anarchy, exerciſed unbounded ſway. The royal authority was coerced by difficulties and dangers; and the famous act of ſecurity, was actually paſſed, by which the crowns became legally ~~diſoined~~ disjoined; and unleſs a renewal of Union could be effected upon ſatisfactory terms, both nations muſt inevitably have been plunged into all the horrors of a civil war. Upon the eve, as then appeared, of that awful criſis, both of them began to make hoſtile preparations, without reſerve, and under the ſanction of laws. By virtue of a clauſe in the act of ſecurity, fencible men were raiſed in the ſeveral counties of Scotland, furniſhed with arms, and trained to war. From a ſpirit of retaliation as well as from neceſſary policy, the parliament of England addreſſed the queen to give orders for the fortifying the towns bordering on Scotland, for arming the militia, and augmenting the regular troops ſtationed in the frontier counties; acts were paſſed tending to deſtroy the commerce of Scotland; and the commiſſioners of the admiralty were inſtructed to iſſue orders to the navy, for making prizes of all Scotch ſhips trading to France or to any of the ports of his majeſty's enemies; and an additional number of cruizers were put into commiſſion for the more effectual execution of theſe orders. Thus, the two

kingdoms,

kingdoms, inflamed by prejudice and reſentment, both antient and recent, ſtood awaiting a moſt awful iſſue; doubtful, whether they were to become eternal and mutually ruinous foes, or friends united for ever in common intereſt, proſperity, and patriotiſm, and in all the eventful energies, which hiſtory now records to their united honour. The degree of wiſdom and virtue which, ſpite of violence, operated in both nations, effected not long after the only meaſure that could heal all ills. What the conſequences have been, admit of no controverſy. Notwithſtanding two attempts on the part of France, aiding the abdicated family, in the years 1715 and 1745, to overturn our conſtitution as eſtabliſhed at the revolution, all that could be effected on either occaſion was, to raiſe a few thouſands into rebellion, while the immenſe majority of Scotland remained loyal and firm. The attempts proved futile, and ſerved only to confirm the attachment of Scotland. A country naturally poor and comparatively incapable, has grown progreſſively rich, and in all the arts that adorn and cheriſh human life, advances ſtep by ſtep with England. Agriculture has been cultivated with ſuch ſpirit and ability, that the native barrenneſs of the land yields daily to the introduction of plenty; manufactures of every ſort have ſpread from the Leven to the Tweed; and all Scotland, in the face of the country, and in the exertions of the inhabitants, as well as in the teſtimony of her hiſtorians, owns the bleſſings of a Union, which reſcued her from ſeparation, internal war, and laſting miſery, and joined her in a participation of all that had made England, and has ſince made Great Britain, powerful, free, and happy.

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Now, here we have ſeen a kingdom, connected with England by the ſame ſlender link which connects Ireland with Great Britain. We have ſeen that connexion ſecure and unaffected, while Scotland remained dependent upon England: and we have ſeen that when that dependence was done away, every difficulty, ſuggeſted to parties and their leaders, a fit occaſion to aſſert new claims, more congenial, in their apprehenſion, to the nature of a diſtinct and independent kingdom, until finally, a train of events, perplexing to the government, and dangerous to publick ſecurity, urged both kingdoms to the verge of mutual deſtruction. Can facts and events be imagined, ſubſtantially more applicable to the ſituation of Ireland and Great Britain? We have not arrived indeed at that ſtate, in which hoſtility, ſeparation, and connexion with other powers, are announced or ſanctioned by reſpective laws; but theſe deſtructive purpoſes have been long purſued by a conſiderable party in the nation, naturally grow out of diſtinctneſs and independence, and for full accompliſhment await only new difficulties and new trains of untoward events, which may ſerve as occaſions, to give to the diſtinct and independent ſtate, the deſigns hitherto foſtered by a conſiderable portion of its people.

Are we then to reſt ſecure, after all the ſymptoms and warnings we have obſerved, not only in the community at large, but in the legiſlature, until the evil grown too great and approached too near, becomes inevitable? No—we dare not reſt ſecure. All that happened, far worſe than happened in a kingdom ſimilarly ſituated, may, muſt take place in Ireland, where

every internal tendency is more malignant, and at a period, when externally, we are threatened with every danger that portends ruin to all regulated ſociety.

A great deal has been ſaid, and very unfoundedly, reſpecting the ſuperiour proſperity of Ireland to that of Scotland, notwithſtanding the ſuppoſed advantages of the Union; as if, in truth, ſuch ſuperiority, taking it as fact, could materially affect the queſtion.

That Ireland is of greater extent in territory, that it poſſeſſes more than double the quantity of productive ſoil, that the natural fertility of its land is in general incomparably ſuperiour, that its climate is more mild and genial, that its ſituation for commerce with the reſt of the world is far more commodious, that all its capabilities are incalculably greater, cannot be denied by any man acquainted with both countries; and indeed, is univerſally acknowledged by all who pretend to ſpeak or write upon the ſubject: but whether, in proportion to their reſpective natural advantages, Ireland be ſuperiour in proſperity to Scotland, makes a very different queſtion.

Ireland, from the circumſtances mentioned, is capable of maintaining at leaſt three times the number of inhabitants; of carrying on every profitable art and occupation in a manifoldly more enriching degree; and of affording to the common ſupport and protection of the Empire, a very ſuperiour acceſſion of reſource and power. Yet, in theſe great criterions of proſperity, collectively conſidered, Scotland, relatively to its natural

tural capability, is conſiderably ſuperiour. Her inhabitants, almoſt to a man loyal, induſtrious, and effective, amount, according to actual enumeration of two thirds of the pariſhes, publiſhed in the ſtatiſtical ſurvey, to nearly two millions; while in this country, by every ſober and rational calculation*, taken from ſuch documents as were founded on any thing like actual enumeration, the number of inhabitants, including not only the merely idle and profligate, but the immenſe multitude of traitors or internal foes, cannot at preſent amount to more than three millions. With reſpect to the linen manufacture, in which Ireland has all along been foſtered by Great Britain, and for which ſhe is by nature, happily, more peculiarly fitted than any other country in the world, Scotland, in her inferiour ſituation, produces annually at leaſt half the quantity produced annually by Ireland.

In foreign trade, that is, in the trade carried on with nations properly foreign and diſtinct from England, Scotland is greatly ſuperiour. In the years 1764 and 1765, the foreign exports of Scotland amounted to 1,200,000*l.* per annum. Afterwards, in the war with the Colonies, the exports were indeed materially depreſſed, becauſe a conſiderable part of the exports of Scotland was to the Colonies, and *that* commerce was then, for a time, turned into other channels. But, in the years 1783, 1784, and 1785, the exports of Scotland again revived; a conſiderable portion of Scotch capital having been, in the meantime, employed in the improvements of agriculture. In the latter year, they amounted to above a million ſterling; and

* See Doctor Price particularly.

if Scotland has, ſince that time, continued to keep the ſame proportion of pace with England, which it had done for a long ſeries of years before, the exports of Scotland muſt at this time amount to at leaſt two millions annually: whereas, the average annual foreign export of Ireland, for the laſt ſeven years, ending Lady-day 1767, amount only to one million ſterling. But there remain yet more deciſive proofs of the ſuperiour induſtry and enterpriſe, and of the relatively ſupetiour ſtate of proſperity in Scotland. The greater extent and multiplicity of commercial correſpondence evince the former; and the greater quantity of ſhipping, and greater produce of revenue ſhew the latter. In the year 1797, the receipts of the poſt office in Scotland amounted to 109,793*l.*; whereas, in the ſame year, the reciepts of the poſt office in Ireland amounted only to 68,256*l.** In the year 1793, the regiſter tonnage of ſhipping belonging to Scotland amounted to 159,175, in 1795 to 145,391, and in 1797 to 136,532; whereas, in the year 1793, the regiſter tonnage of ſhipping belonging to Ireland amounted only to 67,790, in 1795 only to 58,765, and in 1797 only to 53,181. In the year 1797, the net produce of Scotch revenue amounted to 1,487,000*l.*; whereas, in the ſame year, the net produce of Iriſh revenue amounted only to 1,437,516*l.*

1797

Now, taking together all theſe facts, reſpecting that country to which nature has been ſo unpropitious, and on the poverty and wretchedneſs of which, at and be-

* There may probably be more franking here than in Scotland, but it cannot account for the difference between 68,000*l.* Iriſh, and 109,000*l.* Britiſh; for, it has been calculated, and is generally believed, that two-thirds of the correſpondence carried on by means of franking, would ceaſe to exiſt, if franks could be no longer obtained.

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fore the Union, the enemies of ſuch a meaſure for Ireland, ſeem to deſcant with ſatisfaction; and adding the univerſally admitted fact, that Scotland, during the greater part of the eighteenth century, has advanced in far greater proportion than England itſelf; it appears, that the Union of Scotland with England has greatly promoted its proſperity, as well as its tranquillity and ſecurity. We have no reaſon therefore, from the experience of the meaſure in Scotland, to dread a Union of this country with Great Britain as the blight of our bleſſings, but rather to hail it as an event, auſpicious to our proſperity, as well as to our ſecurity; if, in truth, any ſtate of things can with propriety be called proſperous, in which there is no intrinſick ſecurity.

But, be the great national benefits reſulting to Ireland from a Union what they may, it ſeems, that the circumſtance, of one hundred commoners, and thirty lords, attending their parliamentary duty in England during half the year, will ruin the city of Dublin; and therefore, the meaſure is to be indignantly rejected, without farther conſideration.

Now, what will be in fact the different ſtate of circumſtances as to the city of Dublin? ſimply, that one hundred and thirty perſons of conſiderable property, will ſpend one half of the year in London inſtead of Dublin. Theſe very perſons would, in the preſent ſtate of the two kingdoms, ſpend a conſiderable portion of their time and property in England, in the long intervals of parliamentary duty. It is natural, and perhaps proper, in men of their rank and fortune, to improve their minds, and by conſequence, improve

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their country, in frequent perſonal intercourſe with the rank and property of the great ſiſter kingdom. Such intercourſe is neceſſary alſo, to preſerve and promote cordiality of ſentiment, uniformity of habits, and correſpondence of opinions and principles, on the great ſubjects of conſtitution and policy. It is the men of rank, property, and education, who ultimately lead the opinions, and form the habits, of the moſt important part of ſociety; and therefore, the more ſimilar ſuch leading characters reſpectively become in both countries, the more ſimilar by degrees, will reſpectively become all the orders below them; and the more eſpecially, and the more effectually, when the chaſm between the ranks in this country, ſhall, in the progreſs of induſtry and enterpriſe, and their ſure conſequence diffuſion of property, have been filled by thoſe uſeful orders of men, who bind together the higher and lower ranks, and who give to each, virtues, which, without their intervention, would for ever remain unknown. Theſe one hundred and thirty perſons, having performed their duty in parliament, will then moſt naturally, and it may be ſaid, neceſſarily, in order to vary the ſcene, to preſerve and improve their local intereſts, and to regulate their property, retire to their country, and there, among their conſtituents, employ their time, their property, and improved underſtandings, in uſeful intercourſe, and valuable improvements. The probability follows, that more of their property will then be ſpent in their own peculiar country, and particularly more among that uſeful race of men, the peaſantry, than in the preſent ſtate of things. And, if the country at large improves and flouriſhes, it is weak indeed to ſuppoſe, that the capital will not be

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abundantly ſupplied with thoſe, who having acquired affluence, will ſeek, in the gratification of all the deſires generated by wealth, the ſuperiour conveniencies of a large and commodious city. It is not merely by the nobility and higher gentry, that luxuries and expenſive conveniencies are affected. They who are daily gaining riches and conſequence, by means of their own induſtry, or the induſtry of their fathers, (and their number muſt conſtantly increaſe,) are generally the moſt profuſe in their expences: they aim to ſurpaſs in coſtly appearance, thoſe who are their ſuperiours in rank; and though their conduct may be individually unwiſe, yet the active induſtry of ſociety is promoted. Beſides, in the court of the chief governor; in the general reſort to the courts of law; in the ſeat of the univerſity; and in the centre of aggregation, which the habits of ages have made unchangeable, there is more than ſufficient ſecurity, that an abundant proportion of the rank and opulence of the nation, will conſtantly contribute to the full ſupport of the city of Dublin.

Surely, every county and town in Great Britain, except Middleſex and London, has equal reaſon to complain of the periodical reſidence of its nobility and repreſentatives at the ſeat of government, as any of the counties or towns in Ireland. The counties and towns in Great Britain, are in general as diſtant from the ſeat of government, as thoſe of Ireland, and as tenacious of their particular intereſts: but, experience and common ſenſe have long taught them, that the reciprocal benefits, derived to and from the different parts of the ſame ſtate, are ſo multiplied and ſo mutually enriching

riching, as to annihilate all conſideration of the occaſional or periodical change of reſidence of any of its ſubjects.

But, if the city of Dublin particularly, needs an example to calm its apprehenſions, it has but to look to Edinburgh; which, in common with the reſt of Scotland, has gradually flouriſhed ſince the Union; has, not only, increaſed in inhabitants, in wealth, and in extent, but rivals in beauty and magnificence, and in a numerous nobility and gentry, the greater part of the capitals of Europe.

To repreſent the benefits of Union, however, or to anſwer objections to it, we are told, can nothing avail; for that, if it could be demonſtrated, that the meaſure is fraught with the pureſt bleſſings, or even neceſſary to our exiſtence, yet the parliaments of the two kingdoms are incompetent to the accompliſhment of it. But, if parliament be incompetent to accompliſh a meaſure of extraordinary benefit to the community, there muſt be ſome other power which is competent, and which muſt be reſorted to for the purpoſe: for, it cannot be admitted, that ſo melancholy an abſurdity can exiſt in our conſtitution, or in any wiſe or rational conſtitution, as an utter incompetence to adopt, any new regulation of ſtate, or any change in the ſyſtem of ſupreme authority, which may be found neceſſary to ſecurity, or, in any other way, productive of great publick utility. Yet, our conſtitution, from its earlieſt hiſtory, to its laſt improvement, has recognised no other power, by which ſuch great purpoſes can be effected, than the concurrent will of the three eſtates of parliament. This concurrent power, has

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not been confined to the enaction of laws, or authoritative decisions, binding on the whole community, *merely for* the direction or controul of the actions of the subject; but extends to the enlargement or diminution of the dominions of the state; and to such changes and improvements in the constitution itself, as may best serve the happiness of the great community, according to the existing situation of the country, internal and external, and according to the varying circumstances of human affairs. It adopts and confirms compacts with other states, which compacts often make material changes in the property, and even in the territory of our own state; it admits foreigners to all the privileges of citizenship; it confers and takes away franchise, according as publick good may require; it regulates, limits, and alters, the succession to the crown; it varies and limits the regal prerogatives; it alters the duration of parliaments; and no loyal subject has yet denied that it is competent, (though he may strenuously deny the competence of any modern popular convention) to adopt any, the most essential, reforms, in its own formation, and consequently in the constitution, which the security and happiness of the community, may point out as necessary, or materially useful. Precedents, which prove the repeated exercise of these inherent powers, have been so copiously adduced by others, that to do more than allude to them, would be idle and tedious. The principle, which founds them, as it is extracted from the history of human nature, is so justly unfolded, and so elegantly expressed, in a published speech of a member of parliament*, that no words could more

* See—*the substance of Mr. William Smith's Speech*, page 43.

aptly

aptly illuſtrate the doctrine of parliamentary competence. "Our conſtitution" ſaid he "is not one of "thoſe obſtinate and incorrigible ſyſtems, which muſt "hobble on through ages, accumulating abuſes, or "only getting rid of them by periodical revolution: "our conſtitution admits the principle of ſelf-correc- "tion: ſteady to its objects, which are freedom and "good order, it purſues the path which the period "ſupplies, for their attainment; and poſſeſſes, in the "boundleſs competence of its legiſlature, the means, "as it rolls its bleſſings through ages to poſterity, of "peaceably and imperceptibly adapting itſelf to cir- "cumſtances as they ariſe, of attending, with ſuitable "proviſions, the ſucceſſive changes of powers and in- "tereſts, manners and opinions, and of keeping pace "with time, by ſafe and gradual innovation."

But the great precedent of the Union of England and Scotland, prominent in the records of the Engliſh conſtitution, *that* conſtitution which was early adopted, and has long taken root, in this country, ſo fully applies to the preſent queſtion, and has ſo long been ſanctioned by the approbation, and juſtified by the experience, of the great and united people from whom we are chiefly derived, that it may be ſafely inferred, that no other power than the concurrent authority of the ſeveral eſtates of parliament, could conſiſtently be called upon, in the preſent analogous caſe, to make the deciſion which ſhall prove obligatory and concluſive.

In an appeal to the *loyal* inhabitants of Ireland, it is almoſt unneceſſary to ſhew, that, to call together conventions

ventions of the people, or to reſort to any of the popular and newly invented modes of deciding upon matters of national concern, would be to diſſolve the bands of ſociety, and to invalidate the ſecurities, by which, the poſſeſſion of the fruits of induſtry, and the good order of human life, are preſerved,—and, in this day of mad vanity, *with difficulty* preſerved.

In all inquiries into the nature and ends of government, nothing can be more idle and futile, than attempts, to decompoſe human ſociety into its original elements, and to inveſtigate that ſtate of things, which is ſuppoſed to have taken place, before ſociety or government aſſumed any form, or adopted any laws for the regulation and controul of human conduct. Hiſtory records no ſuch ſtate of things; no man has ever yet ſeen ſuch a ſtate; and hitherto, it has exiſted, only in the imagination of thoſe ingenious or idle theoriſts, who compoſe romances upon the nature and right of man. According to the natural ſituations and accidental relations, in which tribes or nations of men have been originally placed, they palpably appear to have adopted, as circuſtances required, the rules or laws of conduct, with reſpect to themſelves and to their neighbours, which experience pointed out to them as neceſſary. Theſe rules or laws could not operate without effectual ſanctions; and therefore, ſome ſupreme power, in every ſtage of ſociety, has been found to exiſt, for the purpoſe of making law powerful and reſpected. Under the protection of theſe laws, in every progreſſive ſtep of civilization, the various individuals in a ſtate, make the innumerable exertions, which give whatever of riches, power, and general improvement, it happens to ac-

qnire. In the progreſs of ages, we clearly obſerve, a ſyſtem is formed, conſtantly recogniſed, and fully eſtabliſhed. This ſyſtem is conſtituted of conſtantly recogniſed, and long eſtabliſhed authorities; and of the various rank, excluſive property, civil ſecurity, and uſeful privilege, which have gradually grown out of the peculiar nature, circumſtances, and experience, of the people or nation, under the protection and energy of thoſe authorities. Now, it is evident, that, to refer the deciſion on any great national meaſures, to the general maſs of the people, in any form whatever, would ſink the dignity, and ſhake the fixed nature, of thoſe eſtabliſhed authorities; would withdraw all protection from the rank, property, and privilege, which the accumulated exertions of ages had created; would betray all the principles, on which thoſe exertions had been made; would eradicate from ſociety all uſeful motives; would deſtroy the whole ſyſtem of civilization; and conſign, naked and defenceleſs, to a ſtate of deſert nature, all thoſe characters, which illuſtrate and exalt the nature of man. The hiſtory of the world, the ſimpleſt common obſervation, and, if it were neceſſary, the example of France, make the concluſion too plain for diſcuſſion. If, however, any great queſtion of ſtate be referred to the deciſion of any other than the eſtabliſhed authorities, it muſt neceſſarily be to the great body of the people. There is no third, no middle, party, to which the power can be committed; for, to any ſuch party, or body of men, are oppoſed in full force, all the objections, as to want of univerſal conſent, which can poſſibly be urged againſt parliament, added to thoſe of a more irreſiſtable nature, which ariſe from the

obſence

conſtitution under which the people of England live, as already has been hinted, *that* which we enjoy was derived. At firſt, the Engliſh ſettlement here was unfit to make uſe of the perfect form of the Engliſh conſtitution: ſuch part as was neceſſary, and could be rendered operative, took place under Engliſh authority; and, from time to time, as the Engliſh ſettlers increaſed, and the reſt of the country became incorporated with them, the Engliſh conſtitution was more perfectly adopted and eſtabliſhed. At laſt, the whole of the country became compleatly ſubject to Engliſh laws; and accordingly, the principles and form of the Engliſh conſtitution, have been, by degrees, ſo perfectly adopted in Ireland, that, conſidering the executive of England is the executive of Ireland, and conſtitutes one branch of her legiſlature, we may with truth and propriety be ſaid, as we generally are ſaid, to live under the Engliſh conſtitution. The people of both kingdoms ſpeak the ſame language; the ſame religion has been long eſtabliſhed among them; they are regulated in almoſt all reſpects by exactly ſimilar laws; and their whole ſum of intereſts is bound up in one fate. They inhabit two maritime iſlands, placed near each other in a corner of Europe; their chief power and defence are maritime; they are particularly fitted for mutual aſſiſtance; they are feared and envied, and almoſt ſurrounded, by many of the moſt powerful ſtates in the world. Could any aggregate of circumſtances, more forcibly point out the propriety of Union, or tend to make the tranſition more eaſy and effectual? and ſurely, no violence can be offered either to principle or precedent, if the conſtitutional power, which originally emanated from the Engliſh conſtitution, which took

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abſence of eſtabliſhed authority, and of that preſcriptive uſage, under which the ſtate, from infancy to maturity, has been formed.

The example of diſtinct ſtates, incorporating with each other, for the purpoſe of mutual ſecurity, or of promoting the proſperity of both, is not unfrequent in in the hiſtory of civilization: and we find ſuch Unions conſtantly effected through the known and eſtabliſhed authorities, which had reſpectively governed ſuch ſtates. In England, in France, in Germany, in Batavia, in Switzerland, there have been abundant inſtances. In every inſtance indeed that can be adduced, it muſt be admitted, that, nearneſs and convenience of ſituation, ſimilar diſpoſition, language, and uſages, and common ſecurity, have, in whole or in part, induced the meaſure; and it muſt alſo be admitted, that the ſuppoſed caſes, which, in controverting the general principle of Union, have been objected, of the poſſible incorporation of ſtates totally diſſimilar and unfit to coaleſce, would probably prove equally deſtructive as unnatural, Such objections, and every extravagant ſuppoſition that has been made for the ſame purpoſe, prove no more than, that particular meaſures, in their tendency, would be bad and ruinous, and that, probably, they would meet with a correſponding fate; but they prove nothing againſt the competency of the eſtabliſhed authorities of one ſtate, to concur with thoſe of another, in a mutual incorporation, calculated to produce laſting bleſſings to both.

But, widely different is the caſe of Great Britain and Ireland from all thoſe wild imaginations. From the conſtitution

root and grew up under Engliſh authority and protection, and which, has attained the nature, and uſages of the Engliſh conſtitution, ſhould, in conjunction with the conſtitutional power of its parent, adopt a Union of conſtitution, in ſpirit and in form, the ſame as the component parts.

But, apprehenſion is entertained, that the junction, of a proportionate number of lords and commoners for Ireland, with the lords and commoners for Great Britain, muſt impair the conſtitution; becauſe, as it is inſinuated, it would increaſe the proportion of the influence of the crown. This apprehenſion, whether real or affected, ſtrengthens the neceſſity of conſolidating the legiſlatures of the two kingdoms: for, it amounts to this; that the motives to unprincipled adventure in, what has been called, the trade of parliament, will be conſiderably diminiſhed, if not eradicated; and that, conſequently, the important concerns of the ſtate, will not be ſo often impeded and injured, by thoſe inflammatory harangues, and that miſchievous ſpirit of intrigue, through which, the factious purpoſes of party, and the ſelfiſh views of individuals, are too often promoted. But the apprehenſion has, in truth, very little foundation: for, the patronage of tbe crown cannot then have ſo extenſive an influence in parliament as at preſent; becauſe, many of the members now enjoy profitable places here, which require an attendance on the duty attached to them, and which, conſequently, they could not enjoy, if attending parliament in England: beſides, the reſidence of a parliament and a correſponding adminiſtration here, requires many offices, which then would

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not be neceſſary; and, the members to be returned for Ireland, upon the liberal plan in contemplation, would all be men of that ſuperiour rank and fortune, which at leaſt give conſiderable probability, that they would in general be actuated, by higher and more generous ſentiments, than intereſted wiſhes for a few paltry places; and if, as we hope, the talents of many of them, ſhould frequently point them out, as fit perſons to take a leading part in the conduct of the empire, Ireland will reap her ſhare of honour and importance, in the dignified progreſs of the imperial ſtate.

At all events, whatever may be the calculations on the eventual propoſition of the influence of the crown, it is certain, that the Union of Scotland, has not produced ſuch increaſe of regal influence, as has, in any degree, diminiſhed the force or effect of conſtitutional oppoſition; and, it is as certain, that, within the laſt twenty or thirty years, ſome of the moſt popular meaſures, have been carried in the Britiſh parliament, that are to be found in the hiſtory of the Engliſh conſtitution. It has been determined, that commiſſioners of cuſtoms or exciſe ſhall not ſit in the Britiſh parliament; —revenue officers have been deprived of the elective franchiſe;—the general iſſue, in informations and indictments for libels, has been completely committed to the jury. Theſe and many other acts of ſimilar tendency, have fully demonſtrated the power and independence of the people, and the full proportion of influence in the democratick part of the conſtitution. And, with regard to the effect of the meaſure now in diſcuſſion, let it be impreſſed, that the lords and commoners, who

who would appear for Ireland, in the face of obſerving Europe, would be of a deſcription, not likely indeed to engage in profligate or intereſted oppoſition, but moſt likely to join, with reſpectable and independent members like themſelves, in effectual oppoſition to every encroachment, that might be attempted, upon eſtabliſhed rights; becauſe, in eſtabliſhed rights, are at once involved, the intereſts of every rank in the community, and the extended well being of the whole.

In the conſideration of the relative ſtate, and the propoſed Union, of two kingdoms, ſo connected and ſo conſtituted as Great Britain and Ireland, the *ſentiment*, reſpecting the diſtinct name, dignity, and independence, of a diſtinct and independent kingdom, which ſeems to have rouſed many to a kind of rage, is of ſo vague and eluſive a nature, that the underſtanding finds in it nothing ſubſtantial, on which to found any rational inference or opinion. But, if national ſecurity, proſperity, virtue, and happineſs, be extended, and rendered mutually more effectual bleſſings; if both kingdoms, in the act of conferring benefits, receive reciprocally greater; if prejudice and jealouſy yield to cordiality and amity; if the power and dignity of each, contribute to the greater power and dignity of both incorporated; and, if all the valuable and honourable qualities in either people, conſpire to elevate the character of the united people; then ſhall national independence, national dignity, and national character, magnified, refined, and exalted, give nobler ſentiments to every ſubject of the United Kingdom, and incite him to

not be neceſſary; and, the members to be returned for Ireland, upon the liberal plan in contemplation, would all be men of that ſuperiour rank and fortune, which at leaſt give conſiderable probability, that they would in general be actuated, by higher and more generous ſentiments, than intereſted wiſhes for a few paltry places; and if, as we hope, the talents of many of them, ſhould frequently point them out, as fit perſons to take a leading part in the conduct of the empire, Ireland will reap her ſhare of honour and importance, in the dignified progreſs of the imperial ſtate.

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greater efforts of patriotism, in the common and illustrious cause. Under impressions, thus liberal and enlarged, may this be the motto, engraven for ever on the heart, of every inhabitant, of Great Britain and Ireland,

Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.

FINIS.